Sunday, August 22, 2021

WHY DID THE AFGHAN MILITARY FALL WITHOUT FIRING A SHOT

 *Why did the Afghan military fall within a week without firing a shot??*


Because of lack of cohesion, the absence of unit bonding, no espirit d' corps, no belief in the cause and worst- no leadership, ethos and pride in the uniform they wore.

A military is never made overnight. Units have established histories and armies are made of these units.
Even new units and young soldiers are carried along in the hubris of being part of  of the nations 'military'.

*The nation puts them on a pedestal- and the soldier pays back by fighting for the nation.*

When the nation so demands it.

Soldiers develop an inherent sense of pride in belonging to a body of men-- the unit.  There is a soldierly bond between the officers, JCO's and men.

It starts from a section, onto my 'company', my 'unit', my 'brigade', my 'division', my 'corps, command and army'; and that finally makes him say ' *'my nation' - I will die for it'.*

*Herein lies the difference between military and  para- military.*

Equipment and weapons dont decide on whether a soldier will fight; or melt away into the darkness.

The Afghan soldiers in this case were the para military and the US soldiers the military.


So here we have one Afghan brother who joined the Afghan military and the other the Taliban. Same tribe, same village, same education-- one was ready to fight and die, the other vanished. 

Not that the 'military' brother was less brave.

The same  two brothers are here too, in India.

One joins the military , the other the para military (CISF or ITBP or CRPF or BSF or SSB).

*Be rest assured the Indian para military brother is as brave and willing to fight as the military brother.*

But if tomorrow you replace the Indian Army with the Para- Military, the same will happen in a 'war'.

Why?

Because soldiers develop an inherent sense of pride in belonging to a body of men-- the unit.  _There is a soldierly bond between the officers, JCO's and men._

'Naam, Namak, Nishan'  --
cohesion, bonding, sacrifice,  fighting spirit, tradition, history; to keep the flag flying.

We are in it together, the unspoken espirit d' corps of a fighting military.

Heroes of previous wars are considered icons. The soldiers are moulded in the unit history, exploits, traditions.
'Izzat' governs a units performance and the will of the soldiers to face  bullets.

Or obey orders to ' _charge up a hill'._

You take away that feeling of 'izzat' from the military,  equate them to the police and para military, remove them from the pedestal they deserve and force them to be part of 'cultural changes' and to give up their traditions;  the  military will become para military and vanish when you want it most!

And I once again say-- the military soldier and the para military soldier are equally brave. But they belong to different worlds. 

*So where did the Americans and the Afghan government go wrong in training a 300,000 strong military?*


Unfortunately, the Afghan military was more adept in policing duties, enforcing law and order, urban presence, cordon and search.

Flag marches, area and city domination under US directions and control; always under protection and shadow of big brother.

These kind  of forces and expensive military hardware  look good on 26th Jan type of parades.

Heavy weapons, attack helicopters, tanks, artillery are of no use with 'policing forces'. Not trained to use them.

They had them, thats about all. No structured military organisation.

Firing a gun is one thing, employing a gun is another.
A  trained No 1 and his team of gunners  can *fire* the Bofors gun.

But it is the Battery Commander  or Commanding Officer who knows how to *employ* them.

So the Afghan soldiers  were trained to *fire* guns, fly choppers, drive tanks and Humvees -- someone forgot to teach them how to ' *employ* ' all this sophisticated hardware.

How to actually 'fight a war'.


- _--- and no war games and presentations and excercises and military studies and courses

When the military heirarchial structure is  weak or isolated from troops on ground with the  added misery of lack of a clear aim; indiferrent  command and control, poor  communications, weak leadership; it falls apart.

You think 1962 would neccessarily have been a rout?? Just because we had .303's or 'no woollens and shoes' ( sic)!!

We could have fought  and ensured that the Chinese got a 'victory' of the type they got when they invaded Vietnam!!  But we had started falling apart, panic with leadership, civil and military, in chaos !
Bhago -- bhago, with many posts vacated without a shot fired or a Chinese seen.

*In no way to disparage those brave Indians who stood,  fought  and died.*
*And there were many*

Thus the Afghan senior military  officers became IG's and DIG's and Police Commissioners  with policemen in tanks and Humvees under them.

*Policing and internal security became the 'primary' task.*

They were not ready for classic  battles, urban or guerilla warfare.

Or  for stopping the advance of an 'invading' army.
Not really trained for tactical actions, support by armed/attack heptrs (probably never studied  pamphlets on operations of war!), battle drills and battle procedures against lightly armed, mobile, motivated guerilla type fighters who did not require large administrative  support or weapons-- only cars, pickups, motorcycles and petrol.


Saturday, July 10, 2021

ORGANISATIONAL TRANSFORMATION, CREATIVE DESTRUCTION AND THEATERISATION

 ORGANISATIONAL TRANSFORMATION, CREATIVE DESTRUCTION AND THEATERISATION

(NEW WINE IN NEW BOTTLES)

D S SARAO

 

 If the Greyhound Bus Company can demonstrate a capability of delivering bombs better than any other agency, that company will get the job

Introduction

1  Over the years, once World War II ended, relative autonomy of the individual American armed services was restored to a large measure which led to competition, turf wars and low levels of coordination in the US war fighting machinery. For almost a decade well into the cold war, each of the services was busy honing and formulating their doctrines as to how theory would fight a war. As a result, in the Korean and Vietnam wars, the Navy and Air Force ran essentially independent air campaigns.  Incidentally, the heavy AF bombing campaign (Linebacker) could not defeat the Vietnamese. Granted, neither was victory obtained by the ground forces.

 

2   World opinion did not allow the Americans to have a free hand.The rule stands for all wars of the present day. Because international opinion allows only this much-- and not more. Subsequent US operations in Lebanon and Grenada in the early 1980’s too were marred by the services’ inability to cooperate effectively leading to significant adverse effects on military performance which was often wastefully redundant. The lack of interoperability, turf wars and inbuilt ‘silos’ hampered attempts at cooperation and synergy

 

3  Turf wars devastate organizations. They waste resources, kill productivity, and jeopardize the achievement of goals. Turf wars in organizations commonly occur in environments where competition undermines collaboration. These fratricidal ‘wars’ have an adverse effect on organizational performance because of ‘silo mentality’, a mindset present when certain departments do not wish to cooperate or share information and resources with others in the same organisation. This type of mentality reduces efficiency and interoperability in the overall operation and ultimately contributes to the dis-array of an organisation which did not adapt to the changed environment.

4  Purely service based domains are not viable anymore. If it is a better idea for the AD assets to be under an Air Defence Commander, so be it. If the Western Theater Commander has dedicated fixed wing and rotary assets with a staff composed of progressive  bright minds of the army and air force to make battle plans for conducting operations-- so be it. No one is calling for a change of roles/tasks of the services but it has to be appreciated that  primary and secondary tasks of arms and services are adaptive, interchangeable and can evolve as per the requirement. In any case the role of any of the three services is not being changed or challenged. Neither is the competency of any of the Chiefs being questioned. A unified leadership team will encourage trust, create empowerment, and break military managers out of the ‘my department’ mentality and into the ‘our organization’ mentality. When we take a deeper look at the root cause of these issues, we find that more often than not silos are the result of a conflicted leadership team. 

Defining Theaterisation 

Carl von Clausewitz defines the term ‘theater’ (kriegstheater) as one that denotes ‘a portion of space over which war prevails and has its boundaries protected and thus possesses a kind of independence’. This protection may consist of fortresses or important natural obstacles presented by the country, or even in it’s being separated by a considerable distance from the rest of the space embraced in the war. The thought behind the ‘kriegstheater’ basically being a theater of operations defined by the commander who is orchestrating or providing support for specific combat operations within the theater. 

 

6  Even the WW II German military, arguably having one of the finest General Staff structures, suffered from inter-service rivalry and overreaching interference/control by higher echelons, especially after 1944, as the tide of war turned. Military operations in the Western theater were placed under the direction of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) which reported to Hitler separately as different from the Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH) which was responsible for the Eastern Front. To give one example, under the OKW, the defense of Western Europe was entrusted to Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, who as the overall commander had no direct authority over Navy Group West or the Third Air Fleet. Both these forces reported to their own high commands, which in turn reported to Hitler. This resulted in German forces fighting in an uncoordinated manner with a waste of sparse resources, as the allies began their push in Europe. 

7  The term theater of operations is defined in the American field manuals as the land and sea areas to be invaded or defended, including areas necessary for administrative activities incident to the military operations. A theater command is therefore tailor made to control  military assets in a theater of war to achieve military aim. Simplistically put, it places all available resources of air, ground and land at the disposal of a senior military commander.


8  In our context, the integrated theater commands envisage a unified command of the three Services, under a single commander. The Shekatkar Committee formed by the then Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar (chaired by Lt General D B Shekatkar) had recommended not only the requirement of a CDS,  but also the formation of three integrated theater commands namely, Western for the Pakistan border, Northern for the China border and Southern for the maritime role. The Kargil Review Committee (1999), which was set up after the end of the Kargil War, had also recommended the creation of joint theater commands. The GoI has already approved the formation of theater commands and there is no requirement of any ‘act of parliament’ similar to the ‘Goldwater-Nichols Defence Reorganization Act of 1986’ in the United States, as is being professed by many. The question is no longer ‘if’ but ‘when’. 

The Need For Organisational Transformation

9   Taking a leaf from the corporate world, ‘Organizational Transformation’ is a strategic method of getting your organization from where you are now to where you will need to be in the future’. In many cases, this transformation is required to address a problem or change that’s long overdue. Studying the effect of automation with respect to the functioning of the corporate world, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) economists John Hawksworth and Yuval Fertig concluded  that for many roles, ‘some tasks will become more valuable and other tasks will be eliminated’. Similarly, in fields such as the military, the availability, allotment, utilisation of resources and the command and control for fighting an integrated battle may need to be structured very differently to meet new challenges. Duplication, waste of effort, waste of resources, dual command, compartmentalisation-----will be eliminated and ‘some military tasks will become more valuable and other tasks will be eliminated’

 

10  The art of warfare and military strategy must constantly evolve and adapt to meet a variety of challenges—from changes in military technology to the development of new weapons; to a shift in concepts of warfare to include hybrid warfare, limited war, unconventional warfare and asymmetric warfare. In the subcontinental context, our ability to fight a two front war with the integrated use of the entire military force in tandem with political, economic, informational and national resources assumes importance. And all this in a seamless non- compartmentalised manner. This becomes all the more necessary as military technologies shift to artificial intelligence, robotics/drones, human enhancement and human genomics. We can no longer afford to be ready and prepared with an archaic command and control system ready to fight the ‘last war’.

11  Thus the requirement of strengthening the centralisation of resources and transition from a strictly ‘service chief headed’ vertical command to a unified system of putting troops and weapon systems under an ‘overall’ commander to achieve synergy, economy of effort and application of max combat power. There should be no hesitancy to restructure or combine roles or ‘have an organisational transformation if that’s what is needed in the military environment of the day. 

Creative Destruction Is Desirable

12  Failure to do so could lead to stagnation or worse failure and elimination of organisations, leaders and entities which do not adapt to the contemporary requirements. Or in other words face ‘creative destruction,’ a term coined by Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter in 1942. Schumpeter characterized creative destruction ‘as innovations and changes that increase effectiveness and potency of the structure from within; incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one’. Creative destruction therefore is the deliberate dismantling of established processes in order to make way for improved methods.

 

13  In the Second World War, Generals Douglas MacArthur and Dwight D Eisenhower were put in roles in which they commanded vast tri-service military operations. Despite the victory in the war, major structural flaws were observed resulting in the creation of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff as the principal military adviser in the United States. In the United Kingdom, by the 1960s, the three military headquarters were integrated into the Ministry of Defence and the post of Chief of Defence Staff as the principal military adviser created. France, Germany and Australia have also shifted to a more integrated defence management system. In Russia the creation of strategic commands was laid down in 2010 and soon after China followed with the 2015 People's Republic of China military reforms and the creation of five theater commands.

14  Today our enemies have some of the finest weapon systems in terms of technology, destructive power, real time intelligence gathering, identifying, locating and precision targeting; all supported by electronic warfare, hypersonic weapons, information management systems, unmanned aircrafts/UAV’s and robotics. This necessitates us to have the ability to strike the enemy by bringing our entire combat potential to bear on the enemy in all three military dimensions of land, air and sea. Modern military doctrine also recognises the need for impacting the enemy throughout the depth of its territory simultaneously -- in the global information space, in the air, on land and on sea; by using all available resources as a ‘complete and integrated’ package. And if this process entails an element of ‘creative destruction’, the same has to be accepted for larger gains in our war fighting ability.

Theaterisation-Not A Bad Idea

15  In the newly emerging scenarios, with threat perceptions ever changing, the possibility of an unsymmetrical or ‘limited area’ confrontation remains high. It would be outside the capabilities of any single service to respond effectively to such a diverse array of threats. Such conditions call for a total and real time coordination among the three services. The existing  Chief of Staff Committee has not proved to be very effective. The appointment of the CDS and formulation of the Department of Military Affairs is still beset with teething problems, acceptability and turf wars. In this muddle, throw in the Defence Secretary, the MOD and the National Security Adviser who also act as the interface between the Service Chiefs and the Cabinet Committee of Security or the National Security Council. And with more than 15 different commands of the three services (plus two tri-service commands: Strategic Forces Command (SFC) and Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) headed by rotation by officers from the three Services) most not even co-located; joint operations, information flows, and rapid decision-making, allocation/availability of tri-service resources; so vital in modern warfare is only in name at best. If anything, ‘penny packet’ distribution of resources exists here; in the existing system.

16  If the recent precision targeting of Palestinian targets by Israel or the use of AI and drones with devastating effect by Azerjaiban military or closer home the alarm caused by drones in the Jammu and Gurdaspur areas are any indication, we need to place a very high priority on modernizing the country’s capability to command complex joint operations in the battlefield. There is an urgent need to enhance the military’s joint command and control systems. As also the joint logistics, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems. The envisaged theater commands will be effective organisational structures designed to control all such military assets in a theater of war to achieve desired military results.

 17  The present system of structured, compartmentalised service HQ’s with their ‘stand alone’ doctrines need to be replaced by force HQ’s which are more modern, task oriented, flexible and threat tailored. Thus there is a requirement of unified command in a theater of war with the overall commander having a guaranteed and lethal ‘force’ of all arms and services to project power and conduct joint operations in a high-intensity high technology conflict by shortening the  OODA Loop.  Time-sensitive decisions can be taken by theater commanders (and subordinate commanders) rapidly, especially when there may not be time to gather all the information or depend on nebulous availability of combat power not under their control. Inherently, one of the goals of designating a theater commander being to execute the OODA loop process faster than an opponent, in order to infiltrate and disrupt his decision cycle. 

 

The Chinese Model

18  Being our ‘enemy number one’, it would be worth the while to study the Chinese model. In its quest to have a ‘world-class’ military by the end of 2049, the PLA has continued to transition into a more modern, mobile, and lethal ground force through the fielding of upgraded combat systems and the integration of communications equipment and other technologies. The PLA is the principal armed wing of the Communist Party and does not directly serve the state. The Central Military Commission (CMC), currently chaired by Xi Jinping, is the highest military decision-making body in China.The PLA’s modernization seeks to improve its ability to conduct joint operations and has been able to create and task based formations at lower echelons that are more operationally flexible and better suited to conducting and managing complex combined-arms and joint operations.

 

19  In addition to the People's Liberation Army, Navy and Airforce, there exists the PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF), a theater command-level organization established to centralize the PLA’s strategic space, cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare missions and capabilities. The fifth organisation in this structure is the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF), responsible for the PRC’s strategic land-based nuclear and conventional missile forces. 

20  As part of its modernisation drive, the PLA has reduced the erstwhile Military Regions/Military Districts from 11 to 7 to the current 5 Theatre Commands. With a force that totals approximately two million personnel in the regular forces, the PLA’s war fighting ability envisages joint command and control systems, joint logistics systems, and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems divided into five geographical entities; the Northern, Western, Southern, Eastern, Central Theater Commands. In addition, to obtain better synergy and war fighting capability, the PLA has now standardized its 13 group armies (roughly corps level equivalent), as part of an effort to downsize and streamline the PLA’s force structure. Each group army now includes multiple combined-arms brigades. In total, these 78 combined-arms brigades serve as the PLA’s primary maneuver force. The theater commands have task based components of all arms, services and support services - PLA Army, PLA Navy, PLA Air Force, PLA Rocket Force, PLA Strategic Support Force and the  PLA Joint Logistic Support Force.

21  In 2019, the PLAN (People’s Liberation Army Navy) continued to implement structural reforms that began in late 2015 and early 2016. The PLAN organizes, mans, trains, and equips the PLA’s naval and naval aviation forces, as well as the PLA Marine Corps (PLANMC), which is subordinate to the PLAN. Similar to the other services, the PLA-wide reforms removed the PLAN headquarters from conducting operations, which became the purview of the PLA’s joint Theater Commands, and focused it on organizing, manning, training, and equipping naval forces.The PLAN’s force structure consists of three fleets with subordinate submarine flotillas, surface ship flotillas, aviation brigades, and naval bases. The PLAN’s North Sea Fleet is subordinate to the Northern Theater Command, the East Sea Fleet is subordinate to the Eastern Theater Command, and the South Sea Fleet is subordinate to the Southern Theater Command.  

22  The PLAAF (People’s Liberation Army Air Force) constitutes the largest aviation forces in the region and is the third largest in the world with over 2,500 total aircraft (not including trainer variants or UAVs) of which approximately 2,000 are combat aircraft (including fighters, strategic bombers, tactical bombers, multi-mission tactical, and attack aircraft). The PLAAF’s role is to serve as a comprehensive strategic air force capable of long-range airpower projection. The PLAAF is comprised of aviation, airborne, air defense, radar, electronic countermeasure, and communications forces. Amid the wide-ranging reorganization of the PLA, the PLAAF too has reorganized into five Theater Command Air Forces, established at least six new air bases, and restructured previously subordinate regiments into brigades under the new bases by disbanding its fighter and fighter-bomber divisions.

Conclusion

23  As is implied by the words ‘creative destruction’, the process inevitably results in losers and winners within an organisation. Military leaders committed to the older technology and outdated concepts of warfare will be left stranded. Entrepreneurs of progressive military thought and understanding of new technologies may create temporary disequilibrium but will become harbingers of new opportunities for victory in the battlefield. Theaterisation is one such concept whose time has come.

 

24  It would be a fallacy to imagine that theatrisation would lead to employment of resources, specially of aerial assets in ‘penny packets’ or that we do not have enough resources or that the concept has ‘huge’ financial implications (to fight a war!). The argument that theater commands suit the big three because militarily they are  self-sufficient, have large defence outlays or they foresee ‘out of area operations’ is not relevant to the core issue.

 

 

25  Two things need to be clarified here. Firstly, allotment of resources to a theatre does eliminate any of the principles of war, but actually enhances unity of command and 

economy of effort. Utilisation, allotment, switching/removal and re-allotment of resources to a theater will always depend on the military situation and the overall national aim. Secondly, diverting of land, sea or air resources (could be in terms of time or space also) from the control of a theatre commander will now be dependent on an organisation which in effect is responsible for the higher direction of war. Service dominated hierarchical control in any case is wasteful, myopic and no longer tenable in today’s battlefield.

 

 26  Finally, perhaps a very churlish argument projected by naysayers is that the theater commander may lack domain knowledge for use of the other two services under his command! Needless to say, the overall force commander will always have a competent and subordinate all services staff HQ's for domain advice. It is one of the primary functions of the staff to develop and integrate individual service activities enabling a commander to balance the art of command and the science of control.




WHEN YOU HAVE TO SHOOT, SHOOT; DONT TALK

 

 

 

 

 


Saturday, February 6, 2021

The Worried Indian

 THE WORRIED INDIAN


I am an Indian first, then probably a farmer. But now I am a worried Indian.

Can a couple of overseas singers/actors and a few disgruntled foreigners (ex Indians), an international posting platform and a teenager more famous as a human/environmental rights activist and an unknown niece of some American called Kamla Harris really shake the Indian establishment?? 

Does our MEA and the political establishment really require to go into a panic mode ?

Is our edifice so weak?
Does our leadership suffer from a persecution complex?
Is the entire world really against us?
Is it a sinister *International Conspiracy ?*
A foreign hand returns!


The international community is rocking. Our pictures are all over the leading news magazines of the world.


Delhi will surely compete for the 2050 Olympics, security guaranteed. Three medals already in the pocket. Kabbadi, Gatka and Tractor Stunting.
We also have managed to annoy the niece of the American Vice President by
extensive trolling, which is our national hobby because no one can disagree with the most populous democracy in the world .
All things going our way.
All systems go.
*( Houston -- we don't have a problem)*


Ramachandra Guha does speak some sense here--

The Kissans Are Not Kulaks!



The Kissans Are Not Kulaks!



                            



 I have tried to keep this apolitical and reasonable. Do not take anything amiss. 

It was post 1962. The Chinese had hammered the Indians. Our political pundits were in a huddle.  The armed forces were bleeding from the nose.

There was no food. The begging bowl was being passed. Many nations took pity on starving Indians. PL 480 was enacted by the US govt so that Indians dont starve to death. Other countries gave soft loans, milk products, farming machinery and technolgy-- most of it for free.

So was raised a slogan -- 

 Jai Jawan Jai Kissan


Slowly the Indian military reorganised, restructured and rebuilt itself. The kissans worked hard, tilled and reclaimed barren and stony lands, new farming techniques were introduced and accepted.  The fields were lush and green. A revolution took place. Soon there was plenty of food. The kissan became the respected 'अन्न दाता'.

And the Indian Army was winning wars and keeping the nation united. And the military became a respected saviour of a nation otherwise mired in graft, corruption, sloth and bad governance (thanks to our political leaders).


Suddenly there was a problem of plenty-- huge buffer stocks. And India could hold its own in the international stage. We had a credible military might and a fine army -  no thanx to our politicians.


Its a factor of simple demand and supply.

 Enough food and a strong army. Now who the hell needs a kissan ? Who the hell bothers about the soldier ?



Its back to-- ' oh you silly leftist, disgruntled, anti- national people, urban maoists-- we know what is best for you'!!

 A Tianamen repeat.

'if we give in now-- our political standing will be threatened each and every time. Raw force is the answer. Dont give an inch or a precedent of listening to vox populi will be formed'

So  are we a democracy--- or are we a democracy? Is it really an international conspiracy against the Union of india? 

Have the days of the 'foreign hand' returned?


Farming practices are an education by themselves and it is not strange that many are not able to comprehend as to the reason for this hula-baloo. Because there was no organised lobby as such. Atleast it was not apparent nation wide, till now. Decades back the senior Tikiat had managed to choke Delhi but only farmers from Haryana were involved and it was more of a political show.

Incentives and a positive govt approach is required. We forget institutions like PSU's, railways and Air India in perpetual losses with crores being given in bailout packages. Because it is in the interest of the govt, the sansads and that unseen mysterious govt  'lobby' which makes people like Harshad, Mallya and Choksi.

An apolitical  organised farmer  lobby was missing here all this time. Now we can no longer blame 'rustic and mis-lead farmers' from Punjab and Haryana alone.

Or separatists and foreign funding. The national pressure cooker is steaming. Time to let off the steam. In a democracy there is no ego and loss of face by the govt -- because it is for and by the people unlike a dictatorship where 'danda' is the order and people are secondary.


For the govt and the farmer imbroglio to end  you have to have the stakeholders involved. Not pass ordinances and bills without debating the practicalities and obtaining views of the *affected parties* . 

And definitely not by sansads who are worried about a subsidised plate of chicken massla in the parliamentary canteen and their double pensions and the like who pass their own 'wage revisions' unanimously, with no party lines and no opposition'.

Agreed, diversification of crops (and cropping pattern) is another important factor. For this, perhaps the farmer is more to be blamed than the govt --  but it is the govt which again has to give incentive and impetus to overcome this inertia. The farmers will hardly oppose diversification. The govt wanted rice and wheat-  the farmers gave it to them. 

The reason, as I said, goes back to the 60's early 70's when the green revolution was ushered in. 

After years of passing the begging bowl for food aid, suddenly we were growing enough food to feed our teeming millions.The govt encouraged ' *more wheat* ' and even our postal stamps, coins and bank notes had wheat bushels imprinted. 

Now a systemic change is required in our farming policies as different from the acquisition and disposal of agricultural produce for which the protest is on.

We all want progressive reforms-- but if you fail in convincing the stake holders and push ordinances down their throat, then the best of intentions will fail. 

The govt of the day will fail.

Agreed, there is some merit in the three farm laws (ordinances). But also some demerits.  Least of them being the way they were introduced  and the way an unnecessary confrontation is taking place  in addition to the blame game. 
Avoidable definitely.

If the ordinances are implemented, 'farmers can sell their produce anywhere—in private markets and in other states'.

Granted. 
 But any inter-state sales will be allowed only to those who have a permanent account number (PAN) issued under the Income Tax Act, 1961.

* Very few farmers currently have a PAN number, it is not obligatory. Farm income is exempt from IT in any case. This point is not under any argument. And we are aware that the vast majority of Indian farmers are not 'rich'. For the common Indian farmer, farming is not a method of converting black money. 
Adhar card , yes, all have it as per govt orders, PAN card no.

*The most affected will be the marginal farmers whose land holding is just about 2.5 football fields (2 acres or so). This is the vast majority. 

 Those farmers who have a PAN number and do pay taxes have alternative sources of income other than agriculture. They are the industrialists, politicians, businessmen; can the state catch them? Not for the last 72 years. These manipulators are not the affected party.

And the MSP imbroglio.

Who decides whether MSP is adequate?
on what basis?
Modalities?
Why is the govt not transparent on MSP?
 Should MSP be there??
Yes.

Many of us keep speaking about MSP and many of us refer to the American model without really understanding its effect and need. 

In the US of A, out of all the crops that farmers grow,  Uncle Sam only subsidizes five of them.
 *They are corn, soybeans, wheat, cotton, and rice.*
Between 1995 and 2017, $369.7 billion was paid out.


The combined agriculture and food industry makes up over 5 % of the U.S. economy. Like the US, we in India too need MSP. It is good and proven economics. Farming practices and land holdings  in India do not provide an acceptable standard of living to the Indian farmer-- more toil, hand to mouth existence, uncertainty of quantum and returns, dependence on manual labour, weather uncertainties and limited  income generatation.

 There is not much incentive to continue farming, second and third generation farmers search for greener pastures  and most farmers opt for selling their agricultural land for urban development.

 A sure path leading back to PL 480 days because soon the food production will start dwindling as  farming becomes an unattractive and BPL profession.


Why do Indian farmers want a quantifiable mention of the MSP as one of their demands ?? 

MSP has to be clearly guaranteed and like the DA, it has to be regularly re- visited. The present ordinances do not lay down a clear, acceptable, logical and equitable MSP workout. 

MSP is a must to ensure that farms and farmers remain healthy and viable units -- and do not become 'sick' like the famed Indian PSU's. 

*In India we too require subsidies for the farmers because farm subsidies protect the nation's food supply during wars, recession, economic crisis. Nations can survive bombings and occupation and dislocation of essential services and pandemics but not without farmers and farm produce.

*Farms are susceptible to pathogens, diseases, and weather and natural calamities, rainfall etc.

*Subsidies help farmers weather commodities' price changes

*Most importantly,  Indian farmers have all become small time farmers with limited landholdings due to the Indian govts misplaced 'socialist' policies over the years. Farmers rely on loans, making their profession  a gamble, one of the reasons for farmer suicides.

But again, MSP is only one of the reasons that farmers are protesting.












 NO ONE CAN STOP AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME  Its like this. Firstly let us accept that oft repeated  adage that 'no arm or service can ...