THE BARKI BATTLE AND THE ROLE OF ARTILLERY 1965 WAR
1 The Indian response to Op Gibraltar envisaged a major attack in the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor employing XI Corps with its three Divisions, 4 Mountain Division, 7 Infantry Division and 15 Infantry Division along three axis. 15 Infantry Division on the Amritsar-Lahore axis, 4 Mountain Division on the Khem Karan-Kasur axis and 7 Infantry Division on the Khalra-Barki-Lahore axis.
2 Barki is a village that lies south-east of Lahore near the border with Punjab, and is connected with Lahore by bridges across the Ichhogil (BRBL) canal. During the fighting, the relative infantry strength of the two sides was fairly even with the defending Pak forces having the advantage in that they were entrenched in pillboxes, dug-outs and slit trenches. The Pakistanis were well supported with artillery in which they had an advantage of range, calibre, ammunition and coverage. Be that as it may, the battle and subsequent capture of Barki resulted in a major Indian victory.
3 The aim of this article is to highlight the role of artillery in the capture of Barki, an aspect often missed out in various accounts chronicling the ‘Battle of Barki’. A lot of facts contained in this article are based on the experiences of some of the dramatis personae who actually fought the battle. A tremendous amount of information of the battle as it unfolded was provided by the Battery Commander, 165 Field Regiment with 16 Punjab. I also interviewed Maj Gen J S Bhullar, AVSM, VSM, who was the CO 16 Punjab in 1965. The General passed away a few years back. I had met late Brig Desmond Hayde, MVC who was the CO 3 Jat (Batapur and Dograi fame) during the ‘65 operations. Brig Hayde, a fearless soldier passed away in 2013 and I had obtained first hand information from him of his experiences of the ‘65 and ‘71 wars. Additionally, certain factual mistakes were corrected by Brig Amar Cheema, son of late Brig Piara Singh VrC, MC. Brig Piara Singh had replaced Brig Shahane as Commander 48 Infantry Brigade during the advance to Barki.
4 I also managed to get a lot of historical data, specially anecdotes pertaining to the other side of the hill, from Naveed Tajammal Hussain Malik, son of Major Gen Tajammal Hussian Malik of the Pak Army. Gen Tajammal (then Lt Col) was the CO 3 Baluch opposite the Indian 15 Infantry Division sector in 1965.
5 Coming back to the Indian offensive by XI Corps. The three Divisions of XI corps had their organic artillery brigades (mainly 25 Pdrs). In addition, 21 Independent Artillery Brigade consisting of one medium 5.5’’and one heavy regiment (7.2’’ howitzer) was also part of IX Corps. Opposing the Indian forces were Pak 10 and 11 Infantry Divisions. Pak 10 Division artillery included 30 Heavy Regiment consisting of eight 155 mm guns (American) and four 8’’ Howitzers (American). In addition, the Division had three medium regiments supporting its three infantry Brigades plus one more medium regiment and two locating batteries. Pak 11 Infantry Division had three field regiments, one mortar troop, one medium regiment, one heavy regiment (eight 8‘’ Howitzers and four 155 mm guns) and a corps locating regiment.
5 As part of the preliminary operations for capture of Barki, it was necessary to secure certain villages and strongpoints outlying Barki village itself. 9 Madras secured Barka Kalan on 07 Sep and 4 Sikh secured Barka Khurd on 08 Sep. 16 Punjab secured Brahmanabad and completed the extension of the firm base for attack on Barki by the evening of 09 Sep. Even as all this was going on, accurate and observed fire was continuously being directed on the Indian troops from Barki village. The Battery Commander with 16 Punjab was asked to engage Pak positions in and around the village. A three storey house in the village, suspected by the Battery Commander to be a Pak observation post came under special attention and heavy Indian artillery fire. It is confirmed from the records maintained by Gen Tajammal (then CO 3 Baluch and who was in the adjoining sector), ''Maj Aziz Bhatti and Capt Mahmood Anwar Shiekh of (Pak) 24 Medium Regiment had positioned themselves on the roof top of a house in village Barki''. Captain Mehmood Anwar was the Pak artillery observer with Maj Bhatti.
6 Noteworthy here is that later on, after the capture of Barki by 4 Sikh, Maj H S Sarao, the Battery Commander had gone and searched this very three storey house on 11 Sep. Task tables, binoculars, marked maps, telephones, bayonets etc were found lying in a pool of blood. Apparently, the Pak OP party had suffered casualties due to Indian artllery fire and some of them had been injured/killed. It is possible that Capt Mahmood Anwar Shiek was killed here as he was subsequently replaced by a JCO OP officer.
7 Once the pre-liminary operations and establishing of the firm base etc was completed, it was decided to put in a night attack by 4 Sikh to capture Barki. The attack on Barki began on the night 10 Sep 1965. From 1930 to 2000 hours there was an exceptionally heavy barrage let lose by the Indian divisional artillery (along with some additional artillery in range) on Barki and the East bank of Ichhogil. After two hours of fighting, Barki was ultimately in Indian hands.
8 Anyway, once Barki was in Indian hands and with sporadic firing and Pak artillery shelling still continuing, the two leading company’s of 16 Punjab along with tanks of the CIH started moving through Barki village towards Ichhogil Canal to secure the East bank, as part of Phase 2 of the attack plan. Retaliation by Pak artillery was immediate and intense alongwith direct firing weapons and armour behind Ichhogil canal. Fire was also received from some uncleared pillboxes and from some positions within Barki village itself. Pak artillery was using immense amounts of illumination and air-burst ammunition, keeping in synch with American tactics and large stocks of munitions provided to them by the United States under MAP. Thousands of small arms rounds, tracers, flares, artillery shells were brought to bear on advancing Indian troops.
9 As the Battalion was forming up preparatory to the assault, it came under intense fire of enemy field, medium and heavy guns. During the move from the forming up place (FUP) to the objective, the forward observation officer with the right company of 16 Punjab, Lt Umar Daraz, 165 Fd Regt, while directing own artillery fire got separated from the leading troops. Maj H S Sarao went up to the leading company to act as FOO, though by this time he was hit on the leg by a splinter. In the meantime Lt Umar Daraz reached the objective and firmed in on the canal bank before the rest of the 16 Punjab company fetched up. Lt Umar Daraz subsequently married up with the company and though under constant small arms and artillery fire, continued providing fire support. At about this time the FOO with the16 Punjab company on the left, lost radio contact with his battery amidst heavy enemy shelling and mortar fire. Once again the Battery Commander with 16 Punjab, Maj H S Sarao though now wounded because of Pak shelling, retrieved the situation by moving up ahead with the assaulting troops and controlling the fire plan as well as engaging targets. The Battalion reached the East bank by 2145 hours but the retreating Pak forces were successful in blowing up the bridge.
10 The next day, 11 September, once the Indian troops were day-lighted, heavy artillery fire was again brought down a number of times by the Battery Commander on Pak positions on the far (West) bank of Ichhogil canal as 16 Punjab re-organised and consolidated its positions on the home (East) bank. It was here that Maj Bhatti was killed. As per the war diary maintained by Gen Tajammal, it was on 11 Sep that Maj Bhatti who was a taking a shoot in support of an attack on one of the Indian positions was mortally wounded. Lt Col Sial, the CO 24 Medium Regiment (Pak) had earlier replaced the OP officer Captain Mahmood Anwar Shiekh by a JCO OP, Sub Sher Dil. The JCO had lost communications with his guns and not being effective, Maj Bhatti, after his stand at Barki, took over the task of directing artillery fire at a crucial moment.
11 As per my interaction with (late) Naveed Tajammal (son of late Gen Tajammal), the war diary maintained by Gen Tajjamal states ‘Maj Bhatti was hit by splinters of a stray artillery shell while he was sitting on a branch of large tree [tah'li] on the home bank of BRB canal’. Maj Aziz Bhatti, who as the infantry company commander played a key role in delaying the operations of 7 Infantry Division till the capture of Barki, was later awarded the highest Pak award-the Nishan-e-Haider.
“Artillery conquers and infantry occupies”
MAJ H S SARAO, SM - WITH THE CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF
