EMERGENCY RATIONS AND SURVIVAL PACKS In my military flying, there was only time when we had opened the aircraft survival pack. Many moons ago, I and Maj RI Bhandari got stranded overnight at Gumri while on way back from Kargil to Srinagar. We hit bad weather, low cloud base, strong winds, poor visibility after T/O from Kargil but homititis made us keep going, all the while decending lower and lower to remain under the cloud base. Those who are familiar with that area would know that from Kargil onto Gumri and thence to Zojilla you fly along a narrow longish valley with high mountains on either side till you hit Gumri. A few minutes ahead of Gumri there is a place where high tension wires are strung across this narrow valley. Normally quite unmistakable and low unless you too are low, flying in bad visibility with snow/white out conditions affecting your perspective. That day we had arranged for all these conditions. We flew low over Gumri peering ahead because we knew that once Zojilla was crossed, it was all clear, a free fall to Baltal and then on to base. Suddenly, to our unpleasant surprise we saw the HT cables dead ahead-- we were that low over the snow. And Zojilla seemed to be lost between the snow, horrizon and sky. Both of us were shaken and with not many words exchanged we backtracked 180⁰. No point in going for that steep plunge over Zojilla to Baltal. Gumri it would have to be. So we flew 'low- slow', circled and landed bang in the center of the small and isolated BRO outpost. A small det really, not more than ten men and all were there to greet us. Aliens from outerspace that dark, extremely cold afternoon with low clouds and snow all around. We were welcomed with a hot mug of tea and biscuits.They told us that when they saw the chopper circling low over the camp they had realised that ' heli ko koi dikkat hai'. I recollect they had a huge (ancient) HF radio set for comns with whatever. Through their channels a message was passed to the Corps HQ and to our Sqn that all is well and the aircraft has landed at Gumri. Bad weather. Twilight soon approached and the JCO insisted on us occupying his small room in the only TRS hut in Gumri. A couple of blankets were rustled up. A bukhari lighted specially for us. And-- can you imagine a 'barakhana'!! With their limited amount of fresh- tomatoes, onions, eggs; and rum--the BRO personnel laid out a lavish spread for us as we all ate together. The hospitality of these men was truly humbling, these hard working men who saw choppers going to and fro over their camp every day. But then the actual story is about the 'survival pack'. The one we see under the pilot/copilot seat everytime we fly out. Neatly packed and sealed in that canvas type waterproof saddlebag, almost WW 2 vintage looking. So after we had our tea that day, Ravi Bhandari said 'lets open the survival kit'. I wonder how many aviators are really aware of what all it contains. That was the only time I opened a survival kit -- I remember there were toffees, fish hooks and line, chocolate, a small compass, medicines, ( morphine ?? not sure), water purifier tablets and a reflector to indicate own position. Plus a couple other small packets and items. Wonder if there are any changes in the contents now?? Anyways, we ate the toffees and chocolates. And on returning back the next day we informed the engineering offr that 'one survival pack' had been opened. For necessary action. And yes, on my next sortie to Leh, I had carried along a bag of fresh tomatoes, onions, a dozen eggs, some green vegetables and a bottle of rum. A quick landing at Gumri, rotors running, thankyou mouthed, thumbs up and off we went !!

THE GLACIER SORTIE

Long back sometime in 1987. I and Mike (Mad) Periera were on a temporary detatchment at Base Camp from the Srinagar Sqn. Mike from 19 Flt and I from 30. The AOC Srinagar base and our sqn CO as well as our respective flt cdrs were probably happy that both of us (more applicable to Mike, less to me) were 'away' for a month or so. It was 'normal' everyday flying in the Glacier, we have all done it. Recce, inducting/ de-inducting soldiers, carrying batteries, radios, sometimes ammunition, Kero, food, letters, cas-evacs and a few shoots thrown in (it was pretty hot those days)---- So one day as we landed back, low on fuel, with Mike grumbling about the weather and blaming me for the tense 8 minutes of 'red light on' flying (it did not matter that I was the junior pilot, that I was not the captain, that I was on the left seat and that I had no control over the weather-- but all that was not relevant to Mike ofcourse) we found the Base Cdr (who was also the CO of the Bn 'inside') waiting near the helipad. He had received a radio message that the body of one of the Bn soldiers who had disappeared in an avalanche a few weeks back had been found near his post. Near Siala I think. Could we bring him to BC for his last rites. Ofcourse we could; and we would. A quick coffee, TRS, refuelling and we were off. The soldiers at the destination were waiting. The body was wrapped in a White shroud, probably torn from a para. Seemed a rather large bundle. And stiff as a board, pardon me. It took a couple of soldiers with some difficulty to lay him at the rear, seats folded. Along with him were loaded his kit and some personal effects, rifle etc. The starboard (captain side) cabin door could be locked, but the feet of the 'package' prevented the port door, behind me, from being fully closed. No problem, I was leaning back and holding it close, keeping it fairly flush. I knew if I left it, the downwash/ slipstream could wrench it free and it could hit the tail rotor. About 10 minutes after take off we recieved a call requesting that we pick up his brother whose company was deployed at one of the posts near Kumar. As happens in infantry bns, both brothers had enlisted and joined the same bn. Twins as we learnt later on. So with a slight diversion, we made an approach to the helipad nearest the post. In the surreal White expanse, horrizon barely discernible, a couple of soldiers in ghostly White uniforms, Cortina's and Koflach boots were waiting. They helped a soldier with his rifle and a bag to clamber aboard. A tight fit, no seats. He crouched, half sitting, half standing. We took off with me sitting partly twisted to the left pulling the cabin door closed, Mike flying. I noticed the soldier getting agitated and trying to undo the shroud. He would move from one side to the other trying to rip the cloth. My efforts to talk to him over the engine noise and to calm him had no effect. He would stare at me blankly. All this while I was facing the rear sideways, holding the door handle while Mike was flying looking ahead and not trying to look at what was happening at the back. Anyway, a few seconds later the soldier managed to uncover the face of his brother. I caught a glimpse of the dead soldiers face, still imprinted in my mind and it was then that his brother lost it and started sobbing, shaking his head and shouting incoherrently. I remember him repeating; 'mein maa ko jaake kya batuan ga, bhaiyon ki jori toot gayi--'. And then he started hitting his fists on his face. All I could do was to reach out and path his shoulder in my efforts to calm him. Mike yelled over the intercom, 'be careful, he may jump out'. In any case I would not have been able to hold him if he had decided to push open the cabin door. By now we were on finals to BC and we saw the CO, SM and a bunch of soldiers waiting at the helipad. It was with some relief and sadness we saw his unit soldiers take charge, unload the remains and take away the still sobbing soldier. Some incidents of service flying remain deeply etched in ones memory. This was one such incident.

THE LIMITS OF INDIVIDUAL DISSENT IN A HEIRARCHIAL MILITARY SYSTEM

THE LIMITS OF INDIVIDUAL DISSENT IN A HEIRARCHIAL MILITARY SYSTEM One of the most common questions posed to retired military officers, who comment on institutional reforms (and don't we all love to give our two bits) is : "Why didn't you speak up when you were in service?" It is a fair question on the surface, but it often overlooks the unique realities of military life and the nature ofhierarchical organizations. Unlike employees in large public-sector undertakings such as the railways or ports or an ordanance factory, members of the armed forces do not have unions, associations, or elected representatives empowered to negotiate with the government on their behalf. There is no recognized body that can collectively bargain, challenge policies in court, organize protests, or force the establishment to engage in dialogue. Or announce a strike!In such a system, an individual officer—even one motivated by genuine concern for the institution—has limited ability to influence policy through public dissent. Within and without. Rocking the boat has its consequences. Careers often end prematurely. As the saying goes: "𝑶𝒏𝒆 𝒗𝒐𝒊𝒄𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒏 𝒓𝒂𝒊𝒔𝒆 𝒂 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒓𝒏; 𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒗𝒐𝒊𝒄𝒆𝒔 𝒄𝒂𝒏 𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆." An individual who chooses to challenge the system from within often risks becoming a symbolic figure rather than an agent of meaningful reform. While colleagues and many officers may privately admire the courage, the practical outcome is frequently predictable: the officer pays a personal or professional price, the institution absorbs the shock, a replacement is appointed, and the system continues largely unchanged. The episode becomes a footnote rather than a turning point. This is not to suggest that change is impossible. Rather, it highlights the importance of collective influence. In our organisation, significant reforms in operational, administrative, welfare or personnel matters are more likely to emerge when senior leadership speaks with a unified voice. Historically, in the military, a three star command rank is the minimum amount of brass which can influence a change. The influence of a single mid-ranking officer (colonel/ brigadier/maj gen) is limited; the combined weight of several senior commanders, ☆☆☆ stars and above, is not. History repeatedly demonstrates that institutions respond when respected and senior leaders unite around a common concern. A coordinated stand by senior military leadership on issues affecting operational readiness, national strategy, organisational welfare and status, or national security would inevitably attract attention from policymakers, the media, and the public. Debate would follow, questions would be asked, and the issue would be difficult to ignore. An ironic example, though outside our sphere, exists. In the 1970s, the nationwide railway movement led by a trade union leader who later became the Defense Minister demonstrated the power of collective action. The movement compelled the government to go down on its knees and engage with demands that would have been impossible for individual railway employees to advance on their own. Whether one agrees with the methods employed or not, the episode remains a powerful illustration of how organized and united voices can influence national policy. The military, by design, values discipline, cohesion, and the chain of command. These are essential attributes for operational effectiveness. However, they also mean that meaningful institutional change often depends less on individual acts of defiance and more on informed, collective advocacy by those in positions of influence. The question, therefore, should perhaps not be, "What did you do as an individual officer?" but rather, "What mechanisms exist within the system to enable legitimate concerns to be heard and acted upon?" The answer to that question is far more important to the future of institutional reform than the actions of any single officer. In large hierarchical organizations, courage matters. But collective leadership matters even more.

 NO ONE CAN STOP AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME 

Its like this.

Firstly let us accept that oft repeated  adage that 'no arm or service can win a war by itself'.

So in no way is this article any reflection on the capabilities and combat power of the IAF.

Without the support of the formidable Indian Air Force, the Indian Army just cannot  dream for any operation of war to succeed; even partially!

Secondly, we all know that if turf wars (and one up-manship) can exist between our own arms- they definitely exist and thrive between the three services;

for weapon systems, for assets, for war machines, for finance and for control over all the dimensions of modern warfare to include cyber and space domains, intelligence gathering, the signal spectrum and even physical boundaries in terms of air, space, land and sea-- you name it.

It took a court martial and a world war for the United States Army Airforce (USAAF) to become the United States Air Force (USAF), the world's most powerful  air force. 

Gen Billy Mitchel is today remembered as the man whose 'idea' it was that air power will be a battle winning factor in all future wars. And the man had to sacrifice his career before his  idea was accepted.

 An 'idea' opposed by many till it became a reality.

Post independence we saw our nation fighting four major wars till 1971. We saw the number of Air OP units increasing. We saw the Air OP convert from vintage fixed wing planes to modern jet/turbine engined helicopters (albeit with great initial resistance from the IAF).

Soon the 'idea' of the Indian Army having it's own 'air arm' too saw germination.

Great Britain had already transited from the old Air OP to the Army Air Corps in 1957 and Pakistan soon followed suit in 1958.

But a different struggle was taking place here at home.

 

Once the IAF airpower and strategic reach began growing by  leaps and bounds in the late 70's/early80's, the IAF modified its doctrine to deep strikes, counter air operations, interdiction and air dominance.

 BAS now became a low priority. It was also felt that a multi million rupee aircraft or  helicopter was just  to valuable to lose  flying low and slow over the TBA.

And as  armed helicopters gave way to the attack helicopter, progressive militaries of the world realised that 

for the most effective  tactical employment of these helicopters in the battlefield, they were better suited to be with and 'under' the ground forces.

By now we had acquired the MI 24. It was new, it was powerful and it packed a punch. 

Ofcourse it was  later realised that these  huge lumbering 'gun ships' may not survive the intense AD environment of the modern battlefield- - and they definitely did not suit our overall plan to fight a war in the subcontinent.

But it was a new toy and it was something and in those days nothing else was available. The IAF got it but no one could really appreciate as to how it would be used in the TBA, least of all the Indian Army.

 None the less it was strange to see this new toy acquired by the IAF doing practice manoeuvres  and stand-alone NOE flying during the early days with hardly any coordination or joint training with army formations for its battlefield employment. 

Meanwhile as the 'idea' of the Indian Army having an 'air arm' became stronger, so did the resistance from the IAF towards this 'idea'.

But the world had moved on. 

And just as progressive militaries of the world today recognize cyber, space and drone warfare as the ' in ' thing, progressive minds in the IAF, the IA, and the MoD accepted that the  time for the 'idea' of  

the Army Aviation had come. 

It was the  'in' thing!

But you required trained ground crews, EO's, bases, support structure, support equipment, training, ATCO's, pilots, evaluations et al.

The IAF, having accepted the concept did extend a helping hand. The brass in the Airforce and the Army knew that the enemy was not within -- it was without.

And soon the AA came into being.

 Granted it was no easy exercise.

 There were teething troubles, some failures, and many 'I told you so's' (sic).

 But as they say-- nothing can stop an idea whose time has come. 

It took it's time. 

And now with time, it's a much healthier relationship of mutual respect between the AA and the IAF.

 Today the AA has the best machines  the best pilots, its own bases, its own maintenance, support and training facilities and the desired amount of integration with the ground forces.

 And to top it all, it is no longer 'unarmed into battle'. 

Times have changed.

In the end, no one lost. We all won.

The Indian military won.

🇮🇳

A hard fought victory for sure - and many will recognise the original

AH 64  below 

MY VALIANT DAYS

  For some time now I have been reading posts from the 'Valiants' and reminiscing
about my days as a Valiant.

💥💥
Though I generally maintain radio silence (but am on listening watch), I could not resist posting some memories of my days in the unit.

  To begin with, I had joined in 1977 as a 2Lt. I will mention the ranks as they existed at that time. Lt Col Hari Prakash was my first  CO, a perfectionist, no nonsense and a hard taskmaster.  Followed by Lt Col HS Sarna and then Lt Col Ruhil. Maj Kochar was the 2ic and later Maj Bomrah.

  Maj's KK Aggarwal, Vinod Kumar, KG Sharma (late) were the BC's. Later Maj Bisht joined us as did Maj Seghal and Maj HK Kalra (probably the only golfer in the entire Brigade those days).

  Capt Hardeeep Cheema (Para) was the Adjt. A very fatherly figure for us youngsters.  Incidentally, his elder brother was the Cdr 261(I) till he proceeded on retirement. 

  We had 130 mm guns with, if I recollect, Kraz 214 later replaced by 255's.  For local ex (it was fire and move though WW2 had finished long ago), we used to go to Mehrauli and Khanpur area and even camp there. For course shootings we had 6 x 3.7" Hows as trg support eqpt. Course shootings with both calibres were carried out in the local ranges on the outskirts of Delhi..

  For practice camps we used to get a spec train and move to Pokhran which was a lot of fun and Perumal, the waiter used to look after us well in the train. Khetolai, Topchian ki Dhani, Navtala ---and deer hunting by Gypsy and KG Sharma (the ban order had not yet percolated) and venison was not uncommon in the offrs mess.

    Lt Anil Kalia was the senior subaltern. Many years later he and I were CO and 21c in another unit and the relationship continued, much to the surprise of  many! Others who served in my time were 2lts/lts JP Singh, Raghavan, Ravi Menon, Unikrishan, Dagar (from Delhi posted to Delhi !), VV, George----

  Capt Sundresan was the OC LRW. Other Capts were Rameshwar Lal, Varma (daddy), Umed Singh Khatri (affectionately known as 'Mess Kesri' in the Stn Arty Mess), Gipsy GPS Chowdhury, Abdul Kader, Chugh, Pradeep Saxena (from Delhi, posted to Delhi !), Vinod Verma (late), AN Sharma and Arul Raj (the famous painter, originally from Bangalore now settled in Delhi I believe), Santokh Singh Bhatia. Capt PK Sharma (an old YO) was posted back just as I left the Valiants. About the same time we had a new capt (IG) posted, I forget his name.

  Capt Deepak Kapoor was the BK Romeo and I was the GPO. Later, when I was Cdr 22 Arty Bde and he was the COAS we spoke of our earlier days in 216.. Capt Balwant was the QM (SL). Originally a TA in 60 Hy before commissioning.

  May have missed out a few names. My apologies (🤗). Memories fade wrt events almost half a century ago.

 *My Quarter Guard Stint* 

I was put into the Quarter guard on the second night of arrival at about 0001 h when I went as 'duty offr'. The guard cdr was Maj KG Sharma (in proper dress of a hav), as I did not have an ID card (it had been 'stolen') and the entire guard did not recognise me as a 216 offr. At about 0600 h I was released by the SM with apologies as some 'mistake" had taken place. Being a fourth generation army offr I knew all about these mistakes ofcourse.

 *The Rock Star*

 Gipsy was a hit in Delhi. His house was in Vasant Vihar. A rock star he was- guitarist and singer. Had a Jawa specially modified in Sanjay Gandhi's factory. They were friends. His single offrs pad had the choicest collection of bikini clad (some without) hollywood actresses and great music.

 *7 Extra Duties* 

Lt Col Sarna once lost his temper in front of the lined up offrs as we stood outside his office for introduction to the new cdr. The uniforms (starched cotton) and the cross belts and Brown shoes of most of the lined up offrs had seen better days. I was the last offr in the line up.

2Lt. 

One star barely visible. Best Tgt. 

He shouted at no one in particular (to incl everyone), and since he was in front of me he added 'give him 7 extra duties'. Well, later Capt Cheema called me to his office and asked me if I wanted the duties spread over or in one go?

"spread over sir".

 He smiled. I may have detected a wink. So I did three duties  in the next two weeks and then to my joy he seemed to have forgotten about the remaining four. Who was I to remind him?

 *The Night Occupation Mishap* 

I think it was in Sept 77. We had a sad incident. During a ni occupation drill, as the Kraz and gun came to a  halt, one of the gnrs jumped out a bit too soon, lost his balance and came under the limber wheel. Fatal. We had a mandir parade a few days later. Ravi Menon will recollect.

 *The Burma Campaign.* 

Maj Bisht had just come back from the staff course. And since the unit had been tasked to give a presentation on the Burma Campaign for the Arty Bde, he was made the OIC for the event by the CO.

We had a small ramshackle two room barrack (offrs sand model and study room) short of  where Manekshaw Center stands today. And 100 yards ahead was our Hockey field (Ravi Menon was a good hockey player) and drill ground. Bang on the turf where this famous Centre now stands.

The presentation was partly a 'play'. I remember Gipsy (sans turban) was Wingate. I was made the IO of Gen Slim and was told to introduce the sand model. It was 1978. WW2 ribbons were easily available in Gopinath bazaar and I had got a couple of them made for the 'actors'. I dont think I was paid for the expenditure (and my pay was a measly Rs 715 per month).

*The Svy Course*

Sometime in 1979 I proceeded on svy course to S of A. And there my IG was late Maj JS Chamba who was a Valiant. His first two  questions were-' did you get pre course trg and is Shankar Patil still the svy NCO?' 

No to both. I did not get any pre course trg and Shankar Patil was the mess hav by then! Another 216 offr (war veteran) in the School at that time was Maj Shah. So despite no pre course trg the Valiant grid was powerful and I came back with flying colours (though I joined aviation much later !!😊).

 *The Coup d' etat* 

This was perhaps 1980. Lt Col Ruhil was taking over the unit from Lt Col Sarna.  It was Col Ruhils dining in. I, Unni, Dagar and Ravi and maybe George and VV were near the bar.

 All 2Lts, Lts, junior (acting) capts.

Away from the bigger brass. In any case we were in awe of the Vir Chakra. Suddenly Col Ruhil saw us and walked towards the bar. 'So, what are you youngsters upto?' 

Maybe I was with one drink too many. Dutch courage. 

'Sir we are thinking of taking over the unit'.

For 5" there was silence. Then Col Ruhill roared with laughter and said-'maybe you should brief me, that's what I am doing these days!'

Well the ice with the new CO was broken.

Must add this. A few months later I was pipped as acting 'capt' by Col Ruhill. 3 years service completed. And within a few months posted out. 

 *R Bty GPO* 

When I joined in 1977, we had plenty of surplus stores.  During the war a lot of replacements had been pushed in terms of manpower (by Arty Centre) and stores (by Ordnance) to make up for losses. TA eqpt, batteries, tele sets, charging sets etc used to be hidden before insps. As a GPO, my stn was the TA store.

 Not to be seen.

 So I spent most of the time with the men. Despite being a Maharatta unit; Sikhs and non Mahrattas also landed up in 216 after the war. Many of the soldiers had wound medals. Patil my opr told me that as he was sitting in the CP a bullet hit his hand holding the tele next to his ear. He lost a finger and the handset was shattered! Close one that.

Chormule, Ingle, Bhonsle, GP Singh, Gawde were the Nos1 with me.

Hav Anand Ubhe was TA hav and Sable, SD Shinde and RD Shinde, Potghun were TA's -- amongst others. 

 Bhintade was SJCO. Suryavanshi was the R Bty BHM (sabh aap se pehle mienay teen GPO train kiye hain). Roshan Lal was the H1 Dvr. Patil was my Opr. Ankush Pawar and Gaekwad were my helpers over time.

Gulzar Singh was a DR (HQ Bty) and Jarnail Singh was P Bty H1 dvr with Ravi Menon. AP Patil was Lt JP's helper or was he with Kalia--- ? JP and Kalia used to stay in the near by ordnance mess as there was a shortage of accn in the Stn Arty Mess.

We had a Sikh AIG ( Harbhajan Singh?) and another one- Ram Asra. The latter was in charge of my YO's pre course trg and we used to go to the ceremonial bty for 25 pdr lessons. Khape was a good boxer and also in the Kabbadi team. Tirupati  was our star BB player. Nalwade was a  wrestler. So was Anand Ubhe.

 *Mien Tehnu Ghassun Marun* 

Loosely translated 'I am going to box you'. Many years later I landed up in 116 Med as the 2ic (Lt Col). This is a story of 116.  Col Kalia (senior subaltern, 216) was the CO. 

As I was getting the regt deployed one cold winter night in Babina rgs, Col Kalia came in his jeep near the svy director where I was standing with the IG (from S of A) and whispered to me that the deployment of P Bty was having some problem. And then he got down from the jeep and began  walking to the RCP with the IG.

I took his jeep as it was the nearest available vehicle, time was short  and told the dvr to get down and  wait there. I drove off to see what the GPO was doing.

After about 30' I returned back. All problems sorted out. Cuckoo Kalia and his dvr were standing like penguins in the  cold, an icy wind was blowing and it was close to midnight. Next to them was the IG. By now the CO was both half frozen and sleepy. Unfortunately his jacket was in the jeep  and I had commandeered it! 

He ran towards me as I got down from 'his' jeep and shouted-'mien tenu ghussan marna'. I grinned at him and suddenly the young IG ran away from there. To cut the story short he later told us 'sir I thought that the CO and 2ic were actually going to have a fist fight'.

*My Dining Out*

  So as the drinks were piled on me, it was my dining out and probably 0ct 1980. Ravi Menon and Dagar were ensuring that my glass was never half empty. Anyway, all good things must  come to an end. It was time for my farewell speech. My rehearsed speech was forgotten, the whiskey had taken its toll. So the speech ended something like this: '--- in the end, on behalf of Col Ruhil, I thank you all for this wonderful evening'.

At that time I was a bit confused as to why my last sentence elicited so much laughter among the offrs and ladies present. One more drink was given to me and thereafter I have hazy memories of being carried to my room.

#3 The Search For Sgt Sidhu

In this post I am giving out a few technical details of the Short Stirling , the bomber in which Sgt Sidhu was the Flight Engineer.---  Type: Four engined heavy bomber. Period of Operation: 1939-1946 (retired from frontline service 1943) Roles: A dedicated four-engined bomber, it was transitioned to glider tug and transport. Successors: The Stirling was replaced by the Handley Page Halifax and Lancaster. Survivors:None. Not even parts in museums. There is an attempt underway to restore one enough for museum display. http://www.stirlingproject.co.uk/

Technical Specifications of the Short Stirling

Crew:

7

Max Speed:

270mph

Service Ceiling:

17,000 feet*

Range:

2010 miles

Engines:

4 x Bristol Hercules engines

Length:

87ft 2 inches

Wingspan:

99 ft

Height:

22 ft 9 inch

Weight:

70,000lbs

SIEGE OF CITIES AND PERILS OF URBAN WARFARE THE RUSSO-UKRAINE WAR

 SIEGE OF CITIES AND PERILS OF URBAN WARFARE

THE RUSSO-UKRAINE WAR

(D S SARAO)

"I believe that at the heart of Russian military thinking is how Marshal Zhukov marched across Eastern Europe to Berlin," a former high-level CIA official told Newsweek in an interview. Zhukov's orders were to "line up the artillery and ... flatten everything ahead of you," he says. "'Then send in the peasant Army to kill or rape anyone left alive.' Subtle the Russians are not."

---William Arkin

Introduction

    Dr Christiopher Brassford, a well known American military historian has very eloquently summed up the politico-military objectives for starting any war; these may range from causing intimidation; to change in policy, to regime change or for destruction of military potential or for taking a slice of territory or for even complete absorption.

   On the other hand, for the defender, the ultimate object of all defense is preservation; and since it is easier to hold ground than to take it, Clausewitz was right in his conclusions about defense ‘that defense is an easier operation of war than attack’. Paradoxically, defense may be the ‘stronger form of war’, but it is the tactic of the weaker force. And if it relates to the defense of a city, the advantage definitely rests with the defender. Again, borrowing a quote from Clausewitz, ‘the acts we consider most important for the defeat of the enemy are destruction of his army and seizure of his capital; (which is) not only the center of administration but also that of social, professional, and political activity’.

   Thus far military history had also taught that a large hostile city should not normally be taken as a military objective--bypass, mask, surround, invest, blockade, encircle, isolate; the bottom line being to avoid entering or laying a siege to a city. But conventional warfare and set piece attacks with the standard  3:1 attacker-defender ratio as normally followed in classic battles (open countryside with minimum chances of collateral damage) may not be the norm any longer. Instead, military operations may most likely be conducted in cities and urban environments. The ongoing Russian-Ukraine war reinforces this. Nonetheless, urban warfare involving siege and subsequent capture of a city will still be dictated by the basic  principles governing an attacking force : reconnoiter the objective, obtain a favorable air situation, move to the objective, apply maximum combat power, isolate the objective, secure a foothold, execute a breach, clear the objective, consolidate and reorganize. Whereas the methodology to ‘attack and capture’ remains the same, the application and use of combat power including aerial assets will be substantially different in an urban environment.

   Conducting a city assault requires understanding of how to achieve the mission of destroying the enemy forces and seizing the city with the lowest possible casualties to own forces, civilian population and the city’s infrastructure. The ultimate responsibility of feeding and providing medical aid, water, electricity, municipal services,and administration then fall on the occupying power. Regardless of mission, cities require militaries to conceptualize ways to operate that are unique to the environment.  Militaries have a long history of fighting for cities, but not in them.

Urban Warfare-City Fighting

    In US military jargon, MOUT or Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain, is defined as all military actions planned and conducted on a topographical complex and its adjacent terrain where man made construction is the dominant feature. It includes combat in cities, which is that portion of MOUT involving house-to-house and street-by-street fighting in towns and cities. The side that controls a major city usually has a psychological advantage, which can be enough to significantly affect the outcome of a conflict.

A well thought out plan with inbuilt redundancies catering for contingencies, logistics backup, linkups with advance forces and a successful ‘conflict resolution plan’ are absolutely necessary when laying siege to a city. In addition, intelligence, interoperability/jointmanship, suppression of AD resources, use of drones and battlefield management are the non-negotiables in conventional and more so in urban warfare. This assumes all the more importance once advancing forces have been halted  or where the time plan of the attacker has been upset. Some of the peculiarities related to urban fighting and capture of a city are discussed in this article. 

      Locating the enemy strong points in built up areas, especially cities and concepts like identifiable ‘forward lines of own troops’ and ‘secure rear areas’ once you have moved deep into enemy territory are extremely difficult in urban operations. Urban fighting necessitates a particular capability mix of mobility, protection, and firepower, and avoidance of excessive damage to civilian lives and infrastructure thus limiting full application of the attackers combat power.   

   Fighting in urban areas is primarily a small-unit, infantry intensive operation. Urban combat requires small-unit leadership, initiative, and skill. Decentralized actions and difficulties in command, control and communications are typically encountered. Built-up areas, close terrain and city fighting are generally considered to be most suited for operations conducted by foot soldiers. Infantry units should be organized, trained and equipped to negotiate urbanized terrain that restricts observation, fields of fire, and mechanized movement. 

   To say that use of air power, artillery (including tactical missiles and PGM’s) or armoured vehicles cannot be used in an urban battle scenario would be a fallacy. Infact the protection provided by armoured vehicles and their shock effect should be exploited to the hilt, but with a caveat- to be used in close coordination with protection by infantry. Tanks in support of infantry are potent direct firing weapons with a variety of munitions and can deliver accurate, concentrated and sustained fires to flush out the defenders from buildings and other concrete structures. It has been proven in multiple battles that without the use of armour in urban operations, victory will be long delayed, if not unachievable. Armour must be used and protected well by the other combat arms so that a symbiotic relationship exists, working together to defeat the enemy. 

   Indirect and long range artillery including MBRL’s too can be used by the aggressor in built-up areas, to isolate the enemy or prevent isolation of own forces and within the built-up area SP, and field/medium artillery can provide direct-fire support. Field artillery in direct firing role with a variety of munitions, combined with infantry and anti-tank teams, can be skilfully employed to facilitate infantry and armour, in flushing out the defenders and for physical and psychological harassment of the enemy. 

   

   On the other hand, use of long range artillery, missiles and airpower can also cause problems for the attacker. In addition the huge amount of collateral damage to the city infrastructure like schools, hospitals, residential areas, buildings, communication centers and civilian casualties itself, may cause international condemnation and intervention. The rubble resulting from use of air power, indirect artillery fires and use of missiles to target HVT’s in a city having concrete structures and multi-storey buildings can create considerable obstacles for the attacker while providing the defender with obstacles, materials, cover, and concealment. 

   Unlike most cities in Asia and Africa, cities of Europe have ‘cities under cities’. There is a vast network of underground structures-- basements, metro networks, tunnels, sewerage lines, maintenance conduits, parking spaces, sub-ways; even World War 2 bomb shelters. These underground passages are often used by the civilian population for protection against bombing and by the defenders to facilitate the transport of weapons, food, medical supplies, ammunition and war material and to hide and move ‘stay behind parties’, or as venues for launching clandestine incursions, tank hunting teams and ‘popping’ out behind the enemy as fighting progresses house to house, street to street and block by block. Advantage- defender. 

The Leningrad Lesson Russia Has Forgotten 

    As part of Barborosa, Hitler had intended to occupy Leningrad. Consequently Army Group North under Field Marshal Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb advanced to Leningrad, its primary objective.

   As the German war machine advanced, towards the end of June 1941, the Leningrad administration, fearing that the Germans would soon lay siege to the city, organized "first response groups" of civilians. In the next few weeks, Leningrad's civilian population of over a million citizens were mobilized for the construction of fortifications. Several lines of defenses were built along the city's perimeter to repulse hostile forces approaching from north and south by means of civilian resistance. A total of 306 km  of timber barricades, 635 km of wire entanglements, 700 km of anti-tank ditches, 5,000 earth-and-timber emplacements and reinforced concrete weapon emplacements and 25,000 km of open trenches were constructed or excavated by the civilian population.

   The siege of Leningrad began on 08 September 1941, when the Wehrmacht severed the last road to the city.    Although Soviet forces managed to open a narrow land corridor to the city on 18 January 1943, the Soviet Army could not lift the siege till January 1944. The blockade became one of the longest and most destructive sieges in history, and it was possibly the costliest siege in history due to the number of casualties which were suffered throughout its duration. In the 21st century, some historians have classified it as a genocide due to the systematic starvation and intentional destruction of the city's civilian population.

   By 08 September, German forces had largely surrounded the city, cutting off all supply routes to Leningrad and its suburbs. Unable to press home their offensive, and facing defenses of the city organized by Marshal Zhukov, the German armies laid siege to the city for "900 days and nights."

   On 21 September, German High Command considered how to destroy Leningrad. Occupying the city was ruled out ‘’because it would make us responsible for food supply." The 872 days of the siege caused extreme famine in the Leningrad region through disruption of infrastructure, utilities, water, energy and food supplies by continuous aerial and ground bombardment. This resulted in the deaths of up to 1,500,000 soldiers and civilians and the evacuation of 1,400,000 more (mainly women and children), many of whom died during evacuation due to starvation and bombardment.

   The tenacious Soviet defense of Leningrad cost the attacking Germans dearly in every way and set up conditions for a decisive counteroffensive by the Russians. 75 years later, the Russians appear to have forgotten this battle!

Ukraine-The Russian Experience

   ‘Sometimes It becomes necessary to destroy the town to save it’, that is how a US army major, during the Vietnam war (some may call it insurgency), described the decision to use massive amounts of firepower, to include aerial bombs and artillery, while attacking approximately 2,500 Viet Cong who were besieging the city of Ben Tre and its surrounding villages. Vietnamese provincial authorities assessed that 85 percent of the city was destroyed and up to 1,000 civilians were killed in the operation.  

  Applying the same logic to a conventional war between two countries, ‘sometimes it becomes necessary to destroy cities to save them.’ Destructive tactics may be required to liberate a city from enemy forces that choose to defend in urban areas. 

   In its ‘special operation’ to achieve a politico-military objective by making Kherson, Kyiv, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Mariupol and Melitopol as their objectives, Russia has incorrectly let its political objective override its larger military objective (and capability)  in Ukraine. The unexplained stalling of huge Russian convoys of tanks, support and logistics vehicles and the vulnerability of the Russian ground forces and aerial assets to Ukranian drones, man portable anti-tank weapons and AD assets have been seen by the entire world. 

   With emergency services and a command and control structure battered but largely intact, the Ukrainian defenders have been able to resist and still fight a coordinated battle. Apparently the Russian military has not been able to integrate any of the modern instruments of warfare; electronic warfare, cyber, space, air dominance, use of drones, media, publicity, battlefield field-management—into its overall plan. Elimination of the Ukrainian electronic spectrum to include their early warning systems, radars, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance sources along with the degradation of the Ukrainian command and control structure before advancing ‘line ahead’ would have paid rich dividends.  

   As per a Newsweek report, American intelligence sources have concluded that while the Russian ground forces have been surprisingly sluggish and uncoordinated, they were also severely constrained in their initial attack by the Kremlin's strategy and objectives. Urban warfare necessitates the need to isolate and destroy enemy forces which have taken defensive positions in the city while causing minimum collateral damage to the city’s infrastructure and population. ‘There's only so much civil infrastructure one can destroy if the intention is occupation of the country (or city).’ The urban terrain reduces the attacker’s advantages in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, the utility of aerial assets, and the attacker’s ability to engage at distance. Conversely,the defender can see and engage the attacker coming, because the attacker has limited cover and concealment.

    From the standpoint of the Ukranians, their main effort is to delay and make the enemy approach to the cities very costly. Four weeks down the line the Russian forces have still not breached the cities of Kharkiv and Kiev. At the present point of time, it appears that the defenders of the ‘cities’ appear to have the upper hand. 

Conclusion

   History shows that the ability of a defender to withstand the siege or capture of a city having a substantial population and a fairly developed infrastructure will largely depend on three variables- firstly, the will of the population and the nation to continue the struggle, secondly a leadership which remains intact and effective to rally the population and to coordinate the national effort, and thirdly the military capability to continue contesting the enemy .    

Collateral damage and international repercussions make military operations in such a complex physical environment difficult and restrict the use of the entire spectrum of combat power available to the attacker. On the other hand, the history of urban warfare is full of cases of tenacious defenders using a single building or a series of buildings to hold off far superior attackers. In the 2004 Battle of Fallujah, it was the ‘House of Hell’, where just a few suspected Chechen fighters turned a house into a death trap for the American soldiers trying to take it. During the 1942 Battle of Stalingrad, small groups of Russian soldiers held single buildings for months against German tank, artillery, and infantry assaults.

    In the end a modern army backed by a large military-industrial complex with the ability to sustain heavy attrition will eventually win the war using its airforce, artillery, tanks, infantry and its overwhelming combat power —but at major costs with its time, space and effort thrown out of gear and at the cost of its reputation and international standing. 

We are seeing it happening.