Striking the Chinese Dragon

  first read----http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/a-mountain-strike-corps-is-not-the-only-option/article4963979.ece

 And now my reply----

Striking the Chinese Dragon

I have read Admiral Raja Menons article and whereas I do agree with the Admiral on a host of Indian foreign policy and strategic issues which he has been raising in numerous forums and has also so succinctly been commenting on in various periodicals and journals , I do not entirely agree with the Admirals views on the raising of the Mountain Strike Corps. I shall restrict myself to certain military aspects only , countering mostly  the arguments put forth by the Admiral criticising the recent decision of the GoI/MoD. For aspects related to the Mac Mohan Line , the Simla Conference , the Great Game,the Johnson-Ardagh  and the Macartney lines - as mentioned by the Admiral , just Google Wikipedia.

    Firstly, the Admiral is right --raising the Strike Corps is not the only option.It is one of the many options which this Country is taking to neutralise the threat from China (I don't think we need to mince words here).Raising of the Strike Corps has nothing do  with dispensing with the need for another Carrier or negating the requirement of strengthening the Navy so that it can effectively interdict the SLOC with respect to China.The two requirements are not mutually exclusive.No Army can fight a successful land battle without the assistance of the Navy and the Air-force.Period . But to engage in meaningful land based operations , one must appreciate the need for a Theatre Commander to have a potent force in his kitty which is not only a threat 'in being' , but can also be applied at the time , place and ground of his choosing.  And pray what has Depsang got anything to do with the location of this Corps or the place where it will be applied. Towards the end of WW2,  it was known that the Allies will be landing on the coast of France shortly --but the question was where??? You hit me here , I will hit you there (where?). And definitely not where you are baring your dragon fangs .

   Secondly, if the Forces and the Country have not learnt anything from 1962 and if we are living in a time warp,convinced that we still are what we were in ' 62 , then we can end the discussion here itself and  go home.Lessons have been learnt in 48 , 65 , 71 , 99 and if we are going to apply that old template of 62' of how a war should not be fought, then the adversary will have again won the war, more so if we keep trashing our capability of delivering a suitable riposte,and rest easy ,  this will always be as  a three dimensional response which need not be purely defensive in nature or restricted to land warfare only.The Navy will still have an effective and major role even as the Strike Corps joins battle.

  Thirdly , the Admiral has mentioned something  about whether the  the intellectual process of our politico-military leadership (the Chiefs of Staff Committee, an Integrated Staff, a National Security Council and Adviser, and the Cabinet Committee on Security ) has been appropriately exercised before coming to this decision. Aah--- the lesser said the better.Here the Admiral scores a point .If there is a Country lacking a suitable body to plan, implement , orchestrate and conduct the higher direction of war , then it is India , the Kargil Report and the Recommendations of the Group of Ministers not-withstanding because all these August Bodies either  lack teeth or are more engaged in turf battles . So Admiral , perhaps it was good that the lumbering ' think tanks ' that you mentioned did not apply their minds or were by-passed.

     Fourthly,the Admiral mentions that the Strike Corps would be ' geographically confined to one or two axes of movement and(is) capable of being blunted'.Wrong on both counts. Put it this way , neither will it be the aim of China to reach Delhi nor will the Indian Army plan to capture Beijing.It is common knowledge that Strike Corps operations are either to capture 'some' territory for bargaining later on , as a quid-pro-quo, or to force the adversary to re-deploy or recoil there by reducing pressure on own vulunerabilities. It also forces the enemy to keep a substantial amount of its combat power in reserve for contingencies directly arising out of that 'threat in being' . Face it , the international community will no longer permit National  boundaries to be re-drawn (forget what happened in the Middle-East in 1967--it is 2013 Anno Domini now).You are not in the Sinai or the Thar, and armoured columns are not going to be racing towards  Chengdu , Xinjiang, Lahasa or Qinghai. Mountain operations  of this tailor made Strike Corps will be infantry pre-dominant with more than adequate artillery and air firepower.Also this strike force will in all probability be applied unconventionally and could be echeloned in time , quantum and space.The objectives therefore need not necessarily be in classic 'depth' and can also  be on multiple axes.

     Fifthly ,the Admiral mention about the' asymmetric power vis-à-vis the huge People’s Liberation Army (PLA), whose defence budget is thrice ours'.History is replete with examples when smaller Nations with smaller Armies and indifferent equipment/ war material have stood their ground . Great Britain fought it out against vastly superior German forces because of good leadership and good generalship. Vietnam held of the might of the United States and then China and with what??And later on we saw how Rommel orchestrated his meagre forces in North Africa with brilliant military planning and leadership.Look around , where all do you think this vast arsenal of China is deployed?? Divided around its land frontier of more than 22,000 kms looking after the East China Sea , the South China Sea,the Pacific,the Taiwan Straits , the Phillipines , Australia, Malaysia , Japan , Brunei, Russia , Vietnam , India and the Indian Ocean to name a few.I agree, they do require to have a defence budget at least three times ours!!

     Sixthly , the Admiral says ' its army reforms have converted its land forces into a large armoured and air mobile force capable of rapid redeployment'. Large armoured forces--yes , but to be deployed where and in what quantum??? Conversely , this Country too has a fairly large modern  armoured force and has battle experience of armoured warfare. What is the point in having thousands of tanks when you can use only a fraction??And ditto for air mobile forces and the vaunted 15 Airborne Corps of the PLA.At best they can be used for trans-regi0nal air movement within the hinterland The high altitude of the Himalayas precludes the effective and large scale employment of para/airborne forces. The Chinese also know that any air assault operation in depth requires a linkup and fast. And what could be the objective--Guwahati? Tezpur? Siliguri Corridor? , Paro? Tawang? Leh?Too deep for a linkup , the troops will be annihilated.A shallow bridgehead  by air assault/airborne forces without a key military objective furthering the overall military plan is a waste of effort, so why worry about combat power which cannot be applied or is only partially applied. If they want to do an Arnhem , they are welcome. May I also add , the IAF will be operating from bases which are closer to the Tactical Battle Area(TBA) and which are at lower altitudes thus enabling more fuel (Radius of Action) and weapons load. Our adversary has to operate mainly from high altitude bases in Tibet complementary with weight and weapons load penalty.Advantage India.The depth interdiction and the degradation battle by the long range Artillery and Air forces of both the sides as well as   the Nuclear paradigm are not forming part of this rebuttal.

    I will now take on the last two points of the Admiral  , the Acclimatization factor first.  Unless our intelligence agencies and our strategic think tanks are in deep slumber , we should get adequate time for acclimatization of troops .In all probability there will be enough battle indicators that the balloon is about to go up.For any large scale operations aimed towards the Western , Central or the Eastern sectors, the Chinese have to cross the River T'Sang po.This is the trigger for our actions or reactions and a political decision as advised by the military hierarchy has to be taken at this point of time. Other than minor skirmishes, wars are generally escalatory in nature and 14 days is what it takes for trained troops to be able to join battle in high altitude from mean sea level . It is also reasonable to deduct that some of the troops of both the sides will always stationed in places where they are pre-acclimatized. As far as the role of Army Aviation is concerned, in no way is it involved in movement , transportation , logistic sustenance or air mobility operations. Neither is it tasked for this nor has it the capability to do such operations.It is the Airforce with its strategic air transportation fleet and its rotary wing assets that will take on this job.And it has the capability and the resources to do so.As far as the choice of aircraft for close support missions is concerned , this again has nothing to do with the ArmyAviation and is best left to the Airforce which has to dedicate resources ab-initio in furtherance of land operations ,which without guaranteed and earmarked aerial platforms,will always be doomed.

   To conclude , it can be debated whether it is better to have a flotilla of nuclear submarines and a three carrier air group in the Indian Ocean as recommended by Admiral Raja Menon or is it better to have a multitude of accurate long/medium range missiles stationed on the peninsular tip of India which can dominate the Indian Ocean from the Horn of Africa to the Western sea board of Australia. Or is it worth buying 126 Multi role jets instead of latest Artillery guns or should it be butter and not guns??!!Holistically viewed , we require the Strike Corps , we require the Submarines and the Carriers as also the Jets and the Guns . But why one at the cost of the other?The three  services have to work in syn and seamlessely ,for there is no point in having the latest jet or the best submarine returning to base to find that the enemy is waiting at the gates,  all because the Army could not fight its battle for want of support from the Navy or the Air force.

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m/user/travisretherford/media/sun_tzu.jpg.html?filters[term]=sun%20tzu&filters[primary]=images&filters[secondary]=videos&sort=1&o=1                                                                                  KAUTILYA                                                                                                                                                         

         
1     Before we debate on the intentions of the Chinese and their recent  incursions in the Tri-junction (Chumbi Valley) area where the borders of India, China and Bhutan meet, we need to understand the  very concept of a ''Nation State'' and the need for a state to have an Army . A State is more than a government. All governments , whether democratic or dictatorial , are transient  but States endure. A State is the means of rule over a defined or "sovereign" territory. It is comprised of an executive, a bureaucracy, courts and other institutions. But, above all, a State maintains an Army to protect its sovereignty and when required, impose its will on other States if diplomacy fails. Wars start where diplomacy fails.

2        The Chinese are adept in Sun T’zu’s art of diplomacy and war and have taken their lesson well  Two important teachings of this great thinker ,who has influenced so much of military strategy , can be seen in the Chinese moves – firstly , ‘‘to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill’’ and secondly ,  ‘’Speed is the essence of war. Take advantage of the enemy's unpreparedness; travel by unexpected routes and strike him where he has taken no precautions.’’ 

          Surprise The Enemy And Keep Him Guessing

3     Not going into the debate as to what could be the Chinese intentions in their latest foray (and gauging these intentions does not require a crystal bowl),  what this article wishes to highlight is that without going into a full fledged war, which neither China nor India is keen on, India can very easily, with a mix of Kautilyan and Machiavellianism strategy , win the next round and take the initiative.

4     He who neglects what is done for what ought to be done, sooner effects his ruin than his preservation. It is a known fact that the political doctrine of Machiavelli  also denies the relevance of morality in political affairs and holds that craft and deceit are justified in pursuing and maintaining sovereign power. So what stops  India from doing all or any of the following---

·      Recall the Indian Ambassador for urgent consultations and advise the Chinese Ambassador that he needs to go and discuss the issue with his Government.

·      Sushma Swaraj  should immediately plan on quick visits to Indonesia , South Korea , Phillipines, Vietnam , Japan , Taiwan , Malaysia , Israel and Australia. Simultaneously the MEA should depute senior officials from the Military and the External Affairs Ministry to visit Nepal , Bangladesh , Bhutan , Sri Lanka , Burma , Maldives , Afghanistan and tell them –‘‘either you are with us or against us , and we shall remember’’.You will also come to know who your friends are. Pakistan will not interfere, its hands are full.

·      An advisory to Indians and Indian traders to be cautious in the whole gamut of tourism ,  education , economic affairs , trade and border movement etc. Trade to be put on hold.

·      Allow the Military to take necessary steps in the Northern , Middle (central) and Eastern Sectors to counter and pre-empt any more such like Chinese ventures. 

·      Immediate and credible mobilization of the Services, the Railways and the Nation in case, repeat, in case the Chinese flex their muscle or movement of troops across the T'sang Po is detected---the whole world is watching. America, Australia, Japan, Vietnam and Britain will back India – no debate warranted.

·      Let a hundred fighter sorties , fully armed , fly over the so called disputed area , without crossing , what we perceive  is the actual border . Maximum and visible use of a large number of rotary wing resources for logistics, troop movements  and reconnaissance. Move of frontline fighters and other aerial assets to forward bases along the Chinese frontier.

·      Aggressive patrolling and maritime reconnaissance by the Indian Navy extending from the Horn of Africa to the Western seaboard of Australia . Use your aircraft carrier , battleships and submarines on the high seas , which are as much yours as any other nations’ . Remember, China has most of its oil and other imports through the Indian Ocean. Do not , do not venture into the South China Sea at this time . Put Andamans and Nicobar Command on full alert. Invite the international media to cover the planned Malabar naval excercise. Aggressive patrolling in the Indian Ocean will help.

·      Occupation of all heights and other defensive positions along the Indo – China border by earmarked Infantry units and reserve formations , with  deployment of Artillery  along-with ammunition dumping. Invoke certain treaty obligations with Bhutan and with their concurrence, move troops to secure your vulnerabilities.

·      The Tibet card---our trump card , dangle it in front of the Chinese and play it close to the chest , atleast for now . Call the Dalai Lama to Delhi the day you recall your Ambassador from China. Xinjian , is also there , but in a later time frame. In case China raises Sikkim or Arunachal, remuind China about Tibet.

·      Do not , repeat do not , take your territorial or ‘hot war’ disputes to the United Nations.That , unfortunately , is the recourse of a weak and un-sure Nation . Let the other party do that if they want. There would have been no ‘’Azad Kashmir, ‘’ but for such follies.

5  Whereas Carl von Clausewitz said that war is just an extension of domestic politics, Kautilya argued that diplomacy is really a subtle act of war, a series of actions taken to weaken an enemy and gain advantages for oneself . A nation’s foreign policy should always consist of preliminary movements toward war , if war is inevitable : “In this way, the conqueror should establish in the rear and in front, a circle (of kings) in his own interest—'

                      ‘’ROUND TWO - GAME , SET AND MATCH IS YOURS’’

                                                                             
                          

PLEASE PASS THIS ON TO A BILLION PEOPLE

                                                                               

CHINESE CHECKERS


The United States and the Soviet Union are standing eyeball to eyeball; I think the other guy just blinked"


(Secretary of State Dean Rusk,Cuban Missile Crisis 1962)