THE LOST BULLDOZER STORY AND THE BUTTERFLY DUNES OF LAUNGEWALA

(The Plaque Reads As Under)

This Tank Was Hit At This Very Spot By A 106 MM RCL Gun Of An Infantry Coy Ex 23 Punjab From The post Area On Ni 04/05 Dec 71. During The Famous Battle of Laungewala Eff Fire By Only One RCL Gun Stalled The Pak Offensive by 51 Inf Bde (Four Bns) and an Armd Regt (Four Sqns)

THE LOST BULLDOZER STORY AND THE BUTTERFLY DUNES OF LAUNGEWALA 

 I always find the Laungewala battle account interesting. Primarily because I was in Laungewala as a CO for one complete year during Op Parakaram.  As direct support unit with 45 Inf Bde. The RHQ and a bty with the Laungewala bn, one bty with the Ghotaru bn (approx 17 km SE of Laungewala) and one bty with the Sadhewala bn (approx 25 km NW of Laungewala). 

 So with the Cdr 45 and one inf bn, for 12 months Laungewala was our 'home'. Up and down, E to W and N to S from Ramgarh Westward' ho to Gamnewala and the area between Ghotaru, Sadhewala and Tanot. Constant recce, temp gun A's, stops, LP's, OP's, tank runs, mine fds-- every dune, bush, hard standing, soft sand patches, mobility corridors, stay behind OP's, 'tars' were marked and memorised on 1: 50,000 maps and sketches. We made so many of our own BP's and trig pts for artillery survey and navigation. 

 Now, marked on the 1: 50,000 meter maps, were certain 'Butterfly Dunes'. A geo- morphological formation of sand dunes shaped like a butterfly seen from above — usually two raised lobes with a lower center, formed by wind from different directions. The natural dead ground where a soldier or vehicle could not be seen by an observer on the crest. Ideal for concealing troop movements and positioning. anti-tank assets. For armour, these peculiar  dunes created choke points or specific movement corridors.

 My RCP was about 800 meters from that famous Pakistani lone tank which was still located on the periphery of the Laungewala post along with a burnt out medium recovery. The only other tanks there were phased out Vijyanthas placed in company positions and used as pill boxes by the infantry!! They had been driven there on own steam and then 'deserted' by the armoured corps! Handed over to infantry for posterity.

(The Barrel Of The Knocked Out Tank Pointing To The Laungewala Post)

 Coming back to the 'Butterfly Dunes'. In 1971, the Pakistani tank columns had used these natural depressions to infiltrate/advance to the our border defenses. They had sought the paths of least resistance where the sand was more compact or the terrain offered natural cover. Kharo Tar was the staging area and assembly point for the Pakistani thrust. Tactically, though Kharo Tar was located just a few kilometers from the border and the Longewala post, it served as the 'jump-off' point where the Pakistani forces consolidated their armor and infantry before launching the assault on night December 04–05. Actually they had come a long way off from Rahimyar Khan-Reti-Masitwari Bhit to Kharo Tar. I think they lost the grand plan here only!

Anyway, post a few weeks of settling down at Laungewala digging had been done, defences completed (never complete), ammunition dumped, mines laid,  recces, briefings, contingency plans, senior officer visits finished with, I managed to locate what I had been searching for. A remote, barely discernible track not marked on the map leading to the border, towards BP 638-- the place where Brig Chandpuri had sent the 'shadow patrol'. The Pak column had entered from near here. I think other than PN Ahluwalia, the R & S Bn CO ( erstwhile Guards, Handoo's Own!!), no one had really traversed this place after 1971. I managed to locate the general area where the Hunters had done that famous Turkey Shoot decimating the Pak armoured column. In the shifting sands, even after more than three decades, there still were visible pieces of shattered windscreen glass, burnt tyres and tyre rubber strips, metal pieces, a broken 'jeep door', a few thick steel cables and most interestingly a burnt bulldozer, just a rusting metal hulk. Unfortunately, I had not carried along my camera that day.

 A little further as I neared the border, I saw pieces of rusting barbed wire stretching left to right of my chosen route. It looked like broken down fencing, some old mine field marking. Theirs or ours, I dont know, but it was here that I decided to turn back. Sand all around, no sound, isolated place, track barely visible, just my Gypsy, radio operator and driver. Prudence was the better part of valour; we could have gone missing, no one would have known!! The PP and the screen ahead of Laungewala were some distance behind us!!

 But to carry on with the story, what is interesting is that 12 Inf Div (Gen Paramjit was the GOC), held two presentations at Laungewala locality itself during Parakaram. The Yom Kippur War (by 298 Fd Regt-- my unit) and the Laungewala Battle (45 Inf Bde)-- The Laungewala battle presentation was at the Laungewala post, a large sand dune dominating the area around it. Quite a few dramatis-personnae of the actual battle including Brig Chandpuri, Air OP, armr, artillery and IAF offrs; Div and Corps staff had attended the latter presentation. We got an actual account of their participation and blow by blow unfolding of events. It was interesting to hear them recollect, snippets like-- 

 * the exact place where a Pak mortar shell landed and killed a couple of BSF camels

 *the exact place where the Air OP (and airborne FAC) crew, as narrated by the decorated pilot himself, noticed a burning Indian 1 Ton on reaching Laungewala that morning

 * the location, a few hundred meters from the outpost where Chandpuri had ordered mines to be laid and barbed wire to be strung post haste. It was this action which psyched the Pakis when they hit the barbed wire and which resulted in daylighting them

 * the story of the Light Regiment 1 Ton (narrated by Brig SL Dhawan, then Lt Col; CO) being stopped by some 'lost' Pakistani infantry on 04/05 night and in confusion being waved off 

 * the fact that till late 80's there were many destroyed tanks littered around Laungewala which over a period of time were taken away by units as trophies-- 

 By 2001, only one destroyed tank and one medium recovery were at the base of the dune. Photos attached. Other than the bulldozer a few kms away which no one except I had seen (wonder if it was located and recovered later-- or is it still there? ). And yes, there were quite a lot of half burried heavy steel cables still seen around the post. Recovery attempts?? 

(The Pakistani Medium Recovery Hulk}

Must add, as we dug gun pits, trenches and ammunition bays, we unearthed mortar blinds, splinters, cartridge cases, bullets, mess tins etc. Remnants of an old battle field. 

Brave Soldiers Had Fought And Died Here

(Laungewala Post As Seen From The Exact Spot Of  The Destroyed Tank0

A POPPY FOR SGT SIDHU -----Sometime in 2012, I received a Poppy for Sgt Devinder (David) Sidhu. My fathers cousin, a man who had died (KIA) before I was born. Here is the picture and letter pertaining to David, whose plane had been shot down by the Germans on a mine laying mission off the coast of Denmark in 1944. The four engined Stirling bomber (W7513) was lost with the entire crew on board. The plane and its seven crew were never found. Devinders name is on Panel 147 of the Runnymede Memorial in London which I had visited a few years back. The Memorial commemorates the tragic loss of 55,573 young Bomber Command airmen in the Second World War and was unveiled at a ceremony in Green Park, London on 28 June 2012. The Queen had unveiled a nine foot high bronze sculpture depicting seven (unknown) Bomber Command aircrew. The ceremony ended with a flypast by five RAF GR4 Tornado bomber aircrafts followed by a flypast by Lancaster Bomber, PA474, which had dropped poppies over Green Park as a message of remembrance for the 55,573 Bomber aircrew lost. And that is how I received a Poppy for Sgt Sidhu!

WHY WALK THE EXTRA MILE?? The new tax rules appear to be introducing tax on the pension of disabled soldiers and battle casualities! I think the nation, bureaucrats and politicians are losing perspective here -- we are throwing out the baby with the bath water in our haste to address the problem or to justify this extremely harmful step taken by the govt. If misused, punish the offender, but do not grind the chaff with the grain. Unfortunate. Let me explain. Dis-ability pension broadly can be classified under two heads. First--Battle casualities with a disability component (you are no longer SHAPE1) and injury is attributable to operations or is sustained in an op as such. You may continue to serve with acceptable disability or may be boarded out. Second --your disability is attributable to military service. Depending on your disability, you may continue serving or be boarded out. Hyper tension, fracture or paralysis in a MT accident, hip dislocation in a Divisional wrestling or hockey match, barrel premature injuries including loss of an eye in arty or armd corps field firing or loss of one finger during grenade throwing. or loss of hearing being a gunner (sic !!) Hithertofore the privilege was given to such an injured soldier to have exemption on his 'entire pension' after retirement. Disability pension is in any case given after you retire. So the normal service component as well as the dis-ability component of the pension was exempted in the IT Act 1961. This was as a token by a grateful nation to an injured/wounded soldier for his service to keep the citizens of India and their children safe and comfortable in their home and hearth. The GoI, through the Finance Bill 2026, has moved to legislatively override the current protections regarding Disability Pension. Now by amending the Income Tax Act itself, the Government intends to restrict the tax exemption solely to personnel "invalided out" of service, thereby making Disability Pension taxable for all personnel retiring on normal superannuation or taking premature retirement (PMR). On an earlier ocassion too the taxation of disability pension for superannuated soldiers was attempted via Circular No. 13/2019. The Supreme Court had stayed this because a mere administrative circular cannot override established pension rules. The new legislation gives exemption only for those personnel whose service was cut short specifically due to disability, and who were boarded out before completing their terms. The disability element will now be treated as "Salary/Pension Income" and the entire pension of disabled dolfiers is now taxable because you chose to continue serving your nation despite a dis-ability, a prosthetic, a tin leg or one eye. Rules will apply to Paramilitary Forces (CAPF) also. Now coming on to 'logic' for such privileges. What is the logic for ESM to avail CSD services? You have had your time. Enjoyed the CSD and cheaper liquor during service. Do civilians get it?? Why should it continue once boots have been hung?? What about IT exemption for decorated soldiers ( ESM)?? No logic-- or is it a cheap welfare measure?? Just because some 'looked down' central services have Non Progression Allowance, should the military start hankering for the same? Whats the logic?? Should politicians have multiple pensions for every time they are elected? My dear sirs the list is long. Without looking for a confrontation with anyone here, let me say that this bill is toxic, regressive, poisonous and against the ethos of a nation standing by its soldiers. It is an emotive issue for many of us. As a young officer I and another pilot had (risky-- but an error of judgement by hot, highly motivated and gung-ho fliers) taken one extra soldier while evacuating from Sonam. Flying at the edge of the flight envelope you make it at times and at times you dont. We crashed. One soldier died on the spot. One soldier became a quadriplegic. I had head injuries. Spinal fracture. Frost bite on my hands. My flying ended. After retirement I was entitled to tax exemption on my entire pension-- like other soldiers who were battle casualities. Because of such priveleges I would do it again for the nation and service without fear. I am astounded ( and pained) when I see a binary discussion on IT exemption for soldiers in this cat. Being a part of the Battle Cas whatsapp gp, let me tell you that efforts are already underway to garner sp of MP's, top bureaucrats, politicians, opposition party members to throw some sense in the govts proposal. Hopefully, it will have the support of the military hierarchy. Ever thought which soldier will go over the hill in Kargil; or walk that extra mile or enter a minefield if a nation does not care for its own!!

EMERGENCY RATIONS AND SURVIVAL PACKS In my military flying, there was only time when we had opened the aircraft survival pack. Many moons ago, I and Maj RI Bhandari got stranded overnight at Gumri while on way back from Kargil to Srinagar. We hit bad weather, low cloud base, strong winds, poor visibility after T/O from Kargil but homititis made us keep going, all the while decending lower and lower to remain under the cloud base. Those who are familiar with that area would know that from Kargil onto Gumri and thence to Zojilla you fly along a narrow longish valley with high mountains on either side till you hit Gumri. A few minutes ahead of Gumri there is a place where high tension wires are strung across this narrow valley. Normally quite unmistakable and low unless you too are low, flying in bad visibility with snow/white out conditions affecting your perspective. That day we had arranged for all these conditions. We flew low over Gumri peering ahead because we knew that once Zojilla was crossed, it was all clear, a free fall to Baltal and then on to base. Suddenly, to our unpleasant surprise we saw the HT cables dead ahead-- we were that low over the snow. And Zojilla seemed to be lost between the snow, horrizon and sky. Both of us were shaken and with not many words exchanged we backtracked 180⁰. No point in going for that steep plunge over Zojilla to Baltal. Gumri it would have to be. So we flew 'low- slow', circled and landed bang in the center of the small and isolated BRO outpost. A small det really, not more than ten men and all were there to greet us. Aliens from outerspace that dark, extremely cold afternoon with low clouds and snow all around. We were welcomed with a hot mug of tea and biscuits.They told us that when they saw the chopper circling low over the camp they had realised that ' heli ko koi dikkat hai'. I recollect they had a huge (ancient) HF radio set for comns with whatever. Through their channels a message was passed to the Corps HQ and to our Sqn that all is well and the aircraft has landed at Gumri. Bad weather. Twilight soon approached and the JCO insisted on us occupying his small room in the only TRS hut in Gumri. A couple of blankets were rustled up. A bukhari lighted specially for us. And-- can you imagine a 'barakhana'!! With their limited amount of fresh- tomatoes, onions, eggs; and rum--the BRO personnel laid out a lavish spread for us as we all ate together. The hospitality of these men was truly humbling, these hard working men who saw choppers going to and fro over their camp every day. But then the actual story is about the 'survival pack'. The one we see under the pilot/copilot seat everytime we fly out. Neatly packed and sealed in that canvas type waterproof saddlebag, almost WW 2 vintage looking. So after we had our tea that day, Ravi Bhandari said 'lets open the survival kit'. I wonder how many aviators are really aware of what all it contains. That was the only time I opened a survival kit -- I remember there were toffees, fish hooks and line, chocolate, a small compass, medicines, ( morphine ?? not sure), water purifier tablets and a reflector to indicate own position. Plus a couple other small packets and items. Wonder if there are any changes in the contents now?? Anyways, we ate the toffees and chocolates. And on returning back the next day we informed the engineering offr that 'one survival pack' had been opened. For necessary action. And yes, on my next sortie to Leh, I had carried along a bag of fresh tomatoes, onions, a dozen eggs, some green vegetables and a bottle of rum. A quick landing at Gumri, rotors running, thankyou mouthed, thumbs up and off we went !!

THE GLACIER SORTIE

Long back sometime in 1987. I and Mike (Mad) Periera were on a temporary detatchment at Base Camp from the Srinagar Sqn. Mike from 19 Flt and I from 30. The AOC Srinagar base and our sqn CO as well as our respective flt cdrs were probably happy that both of us (more applicable to Mike, less to me) were 'away' for a month or so. It was 'normal' everyday flying in the Glacier, we have all done it. Recce, inducting/ de-inducting soldiers, carrying batteries, radios, sometimes ammunition, Kero, food, letters, cas-evacs and a few shoots thrown in (it was pretty hot those days)---- So one day as we landed back, low on fuel, with Mike grumbling about the weather and blaming me for the tense 8 minutes of 'red light on' flying (it did not matter that I was the junior pilot, that I was not the captain, that I was on the left seat and that I had no control over the weather-- but all that was not relevant to Mike ofcourse) we found the Base Cdr (who was also the CO of the Bn 'inside') waiting near the helipad. He had received a radio message that the body of one of the Bn soldiers who had disappeared in an avalanche a few weeks back had been found near his post. Near Siala I think. Could we bring him to BC for his last rites. Ofcourse we could; and we would. A quick coffee, TRS, refuelling and we were off. The soldiers at the destination were waiting. The body was wrapped in a White shroud, probably torn from a para. Seemed a rather large bundle. And stiff as a board, pardon me. It took a couple of soldiers with some difficulty to lay him at the rear, seats folded. Along with him were loaded his kit and some personal effects, rifle etc. The starboard (captain side) cabin door could be locked, but the feet of the 'package' prevented the port door, behind me, from being fully closed. No problem, I was leaning back and holding it close, keeping it fairly flush. I knew if I left it, the downwash/ slipstream could wrench it free and it could hit the tail rotor. About 10 minutes after take off we recieved a call requesting that we pick up his brother whose company was deployed at one of the posts near Kumar. As happens in infantry bns, both brothers had enlisted and joined the same bn. Twins as we learnt later on. So with a slight diversion, we made an approach to the helipad nearest the post. In the surreal White expanse, horrizon barely discernible, a couple of soldiers in ghostly White uniforms, Cortina's and Koflach boots were waiting. They helped a soldier with his rifle and a bag to clamber aboard. A tight fit, no seats. He crouched, half sitting, half standing. We took off with me sitting partly twisted to the left pulling the cabin door closed, Mike flying. I noticed the soldier getting agitated and trying to undo the shroud. He would move from one side to the other trying to rip the cloth. My efforts to talk to him over the engine noise and to calm him had no effect. He would stare at me blankly. All this while I was facing the rear sideways, holding the door handle while Mike was flying looking ahead and not trying to look at what was happening at the back. Anyway, a few seconds later the soldier managed to uncover the face of his brother. I caught a glimpse of the dead soldiers face, still imprinted in my mind and it was then that his brother lost it and started sobbing, shaking his head and shouting incoherrently. I remember him repeating; 'mein maa ko jaake kya batuan ga, bhaiyon ki jori toot gayi--'. And then he started hitting his fists on his face. All I could do was to reach out and path his shoulder in my efforts to calm him. Mike yelled over the intercom, 'be careful, he may jump out'. In any case I would not have been able to hold him if he had decided to push open the cabin door. By now we were on finals to BC and we saw the CO, SM and a bunch of soldiers waiting at the helipad. It was with some relief and sadness we saw his unit soldiers take charge, unload the remains and take away the still sobbing soldier. Some incidents of service flying remain deeply etched in ones memory. This was one such incident.

THE LIMITS OF INDIVIDUAL DISSENT IN A HEIRARCHIAL MILITARY SYSTEM

THE LIMITS OF INDIVIDUAL DISSENT IN A HEIRARCHIAL MILITARY SYSTEM One of the most common questions posed to retired military officers, who comment on institutional reforms (and don't we all love to give our two bits) is : "Why didn't you speak up when you were in service?" It is a fair question on the surface, but it often overlooks the unique realities of military life and the nature ofhierarchical organizations. Unlike employees in large public-sector undertakings such as the railways or ports or an ordanance factory, members of the armed forces do not have unions, associations, or elected representatives empowered to negotiate with the government on their behalf. There is no recognized body that can collectively bargain, challenge policies in court, organize protests, or force the establishment to engage in dialogue. Or announce a strike!In such a system, an individual officer—even one motivated by genuine concern for the institution—has limited ability to influence policy through public dissent. Within and without. Rocking the boat has its consequences. Careers often end prematurely. As the saying goes: "𝑶𝒏𝒆 𝒗𝒐𝒊𝒄𝒆 𝒄𝒂𝒏 𝒓𝒂𝒊𝒔𝒆 𝒂 𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒓𝒏; 𝒎𝒂𝒏𝒚 𝒗𝒐𝒊𝒄𝒆𝒔 𝒄𝒂𝒏 𝒄𝒓𝒆𝒂𝒕𝒆 𝒄𝒉𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒆." An individual who chooses to challenge the system from within often risks becoming a symbolic figure rather than an agent of meaningful reform. While colleagues and many officers may privately admire the courage, the practical outcome is frequently predictable: the officer pays a personal or professional price, the institution absorbs the shock, a replacement is appointed, and the system continues largely unchanged. The episode becomes a footnote rather than a turning point. This is not to suggest that change is impossible. Rather, it highlights the importance of collective influence. In our organisation, significant reforms in operational, administrative, welfare or personnel matters are more likely to emerge when senior leadership speaks with a unified voice. Historically, in the military, a three star command rank is the minimum amount of brass which can influence a change. The influence of a single mid-ranking officer (colonel/ brigadier/maj gen) is limited; the combined weight of several senior commanders, ☆☆☆ stars and above, is not. History repeatedly demonstrates that institutions respond when respected and senior leaders unite around a common concern. A coordinated stand by senior military leadership on issues affecting operational readiness, national strategy, organisational welfare and status, or national security would inevitably attract attention from policymakers, the media, and the public. Debate would follow, questions would be asked, and the issue would be difficult to ignore. An ironic example, though outside our sphere, exists. In the 1970s, the nationwide railway movement led by a trade union leader who later became the Defense Minister demonstrated the power of collective action. The movement compelled the government to go down on its knees and engage with demands that would have been impossible for individual railway employees to advance on their own. Whether one agrees with the methods employed or not, the episode remains a powerful illustration of how organized and united voices can influence national policy. The military, by design, values discipline, cohesion, and the chain of command. These are essential attributes for operational effectiveness. However, they also mean that meaningful institutional change often depends less on individual acts of defiance and more on informed, collective advocacy by those in positions of influence. The question, therefore, should perhaps not be, "What did you do as an individual officer?" but rather, "What mechanisms exist within the system to enable legitimate concerns to be heard and acted upon?" The answer to that question is far more important to the future of institutional reform than the actions of any single officer. In large hierarchical organizations, courage matters. But collective leadership matters even more.

 NO ONE CAN STOP AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME 

Its like this.

Firstly let us accept that oft repeated  adage that 'no arm or service can win a war by itself'.

So in no way is this article any reflection on the capabilities and combat power of the IAF.

Without the support of the formidable Indian Air Force, the Indian Army just cannot  dream for any operation of war to succeed; even partially!

Secondly, we all know that if turf wars (and one up-manship) can exist between our own arms- they definitely exist and thrive between the three services;

for weapon systems, for assets, for war machines, for finance and for control over all the dimensions of modern warfare to include cyber and space domains, intelligence gathering, the signal spectrum and even physical boundaries in terms of air, space, land and sea-- you name it.

It took a court martial and a world war for the United States Army Airforce (USAAF) to become the United States Air Force (USAF), the world's most powerful  air force. 

Gen Billy Mitchel is today remembered as the man whose 'idea' it was that air power will be a battle winning factor in all future wars. And the man had to sacrifice his career before his  idea was accepted.

 An 'idea' opposed by many till it became a reality.

Post independence we saw our nation fighting four major wars till 1971. We saw the number of Air OP units increasing. We saw the Air OP convert from vintage fixed wing planes to modern jet/turbine engined helicopters (albeit with great initial resistance from the IAF).

Soon the 'idea' of the Indian Army having it's own 'air arm' too saw germination.

Great Britain had already transited from the old Air OP to the Army Air Corps in 1957 and Pakistan soon followed suit in 1958.

But a different struggle was taking place here at home.

 

Once the IAF airpower and strategic reach began growing by  leaps and bounds in the late 70's/early80's, the IAF modified its doctrine to deep strikes, counter air operations, interdiction and air dominance.

 BAS now became a low priority. It was also felt that a multi million rupee aircraft or  helicopter was just  to valuable to lose  flying low and slow over the TBA.

And as  armed helicopters gave way to the attack helicopter, progressive militaries of the world realised that 

for the most effective  tactical employment of these helicopters in the battlefield, they were better suited to be with and 'under' the ground forces.

By now we had acquired the MI 24. It was new, it was powerful and it packed a punch. 

Ofcourse it was  later realised that these  huge lumbering 'gun ships' may not survive the intense AD environment of the modern battlefield- - and they definitely did not suit our overall plan to fight a war in the subcontinent.

But it was a new toy and it was something and in those days nothing else was available. The IAF got it but no one could really appreciate as to how it would be used in the TBA, least of all the Indian Army.

 None the less it was strange to see this new toy acquired by the IAF doing practice manoeuvres  and stand-alone NOE flying during the early days with hardly any coordination or joint training with army formations for its battlefield employment. 

Meanwhile as the 'idea' of the Indian Army having an 'air arm' became stronger, so did the resistance from the IAF towards this 'idea'.

But the world had moved on. 

And just as progressive militaries of the world today recognize cyber, space and drone warfare as the ' in ' thing, progressive minds in the IAF, the IA, and the MoD accepted that the  time for the 'idea' of  

the Army Aviation had come. 

It was the  'in' thing!

But you required trained ground crews, EO's, bases, support structure, support equipment, training, ATCO's, pilots, evaluations et al.

The IAF, having accepted the concept did extend a helping hand. The brass in the Airforce and the Army knew that the enemy was not within -- it was without.

And soon the AA came into being.

 Granted it was no easy exercise.

 There were teething troubles, some failures, and many 'I told you so's' (sic).

 But as they say-- nothing can stop an idea whose time has come. 

It took it's time. 

And now with time, it's a much healthier relationship of mutual respect between the AA and the IAF.

 Today the AA has the best machines  the best pilots, its own bases, its own maintenance, support and training facilities and the desired amount of integration with the ground forces.

 And to top it all, it is no longer 'unarmed into battle'. 

Times have changed.

In the end, no one lost. We all won.

The Indian military won.

🇮🇳

A hard fought victory for sure - and many will recognise the original

AH 64  below