NO ONE CAN STOP AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME 

Its like this.

Firstly let us accept that oft repeated  adage that 'no arm or service can win a war by itself'.

So in no way is this article any reflection on the capabilities and combat power of the IAF.

Without the support of the formidable Indian Air Force, the Indian Army just cannot  dream for any operation of war to succeed; even partially!

Secondly, we all know that if turf wars (and one up-manship) can exist between our own arms- they definitely exist and thrive between the three services;

for weapon systems, for assets, for war machines, for finance and for control over all the dimensions of modern warfare to include cyber and space domains, intelligence gathering, the signal spectrum and even physical boundaries in terms of air, space, land and sea-- you name it.

It took a court martial and a world war for the United States Army Airforce (USAAF) to become the United States Air Force (USAF), the world's most powerful  air force. 

Gen Billy Mitchel is today remembered as the man whose 'idea' it was that air power will be a battle winning factor in all future wars. And the man had to sacrifice his career before his  idea was accepted.

 An 'idea' opposed by many till it became a reality.

Post independence we saw our nation fighting four major wars till 1971. We saw the number of Air OP units increasing. We saw the Air OP convert from vintage fixed wing planes to modern jet/turbine engined helicopters (albeit with great initial resistance from the IAF).

Soon the 'idea' of the Indian Army having it's own 'air arm' too saw germination.

Great Britain had already transited from the old Air OP to the Army Air Corps in 1957 and Pakistan soon followed suit in 1958.

But a different struggle was taking place here at home.

 

Once the IAF airpower and strategic reach began growing by  leaps and bounds in the late 70's/early80's, the IAF modified its doctrine to deep strikes, counter air operations, interdiction and air dominance.

 BAS now became a low priority. It was also felt that a multi million rupee aircraft or  helicopter was just  to valuable to lose  flying low and slow over the TBA.

And as  armed helicopters gave way to the attack helicopter, progressive militaries of the world realised that 

for the most effective  tactical employment of these helicopters in the battlefield, they were better suited to be with and 'under' the ground forces.

By now we had acquired the MI 24. It was new, it was powerful and it packed a punch. 

Ofcourse it was  later realised that these  huge lumbering 'gun ships' may not survive the intense AD environment of the modern battlefield- - and they definitely did not suit our overall plan to fight a war in the subcontinent.

But it was a new toy and it was something and in those days nothing else was available. The IAF got it but no one could really appreciate as to how it would be used in the TBA, least of all the Indian Army.

 None the less it was strange to see this new toy acquired by the IAF doing practice manoeuvres  and stand-alone NOE flying during the early days with hardly any coordination or joint training with army formations for its battlefield employment. 

Meanwhile as the 'idea' of the Indian Army having an 'air arm' became stronger, so did the resistance from the IAF towards this 'idea'.

But the world had moved on. 

And just as progressive militaries of the world today recognize cyber, space and drone warfare as the ' in ' thing, progressive minds in the IAF, the IA, and the MoD accepted that the  time for the 'idea' of  

the Army Aviation had come. 

It was the  'in' thing!

But you required trained ground crews, EO's, bases, support structure, support equipment, training, ATCO's, pilots, evaluations et al.

The IAF, having accepted the concept did extend a helping hand. The brass in the Airforce and the Army knew that the enemy was not within -- it was without.

And soon the AA came into being.

 Granted it was no easy exercise.

 There were teething troubles, some failures, and many 'I told you so's' (sic).

 But as they say-- nothing can stop an idea whose time has come. 

It took it's time. 

And now with time, it's a much healthier relationship of mutual respect between the AA and the IAF.

 Today the AA has the best machines  the best pilots, its own bases, its own maintenance, support and training facilities and the desired amount of integration with the ground forces.

 And to top it all, it is no longer 'unarmed into battle'. 

Times have changed.

In the end, no one lost. We all won.

The Indian military won.

🇮🇳

A hard fought victory for sure - and many will recognise the original

AH 64  below 

MY VALIANT DAYS

  For some time now I have been reading posts from the 'Valiants' and reminiscing
about my days as a Valiant.

💥💥
Though I generally maintain radio silence (but am on listening watch), I could not resist posting some memories of my days in the unit.

  To begin with, I had joined in 1977 as a 2Lt. I will mention the ranks as they existed at that time. Lt Col Hari Prakash was my first  CO, a perfectionist, no nonsense and a hard taskmaster.  Followed by Lt Col HS Sarna and then Lt Col Ruhil. Maj Kochar was the 2ic and later Maj Bomrah.

  Maj's KK Aggarwal, Vinod Kumar, KG Sharma (late) were the BC's. Later Maj Bisht joined us as did Maj Seghal and Maj HK Kalra (probably the only golfer in the entire Brigade those days).

  Capt Hardeeep Cheema (Para) was the Adjt. A very fatherly figure for us youngsters.  Incidentally, his elder brother was the Cdr 261(I) till he proceeded on retirement. 

  We had 130 mm guns with, if I recollect, Kraz 214 later replaced by 255's.  For local ex (it was fire and move though WW2 had finished long ago), we used to go to Mehrauli and Khanpur area and even camp there. For course shootings we had 6 x 3.7" Hows as trg support eqpt. Course shootings with both calibres were carried out in the local ranges on the outskirts of Delhi..

  For practice camps we used to get a spec train and move to Pokhran which was a lot of fun and Perumal, the waiter used to look after us well in the train. Khetolai, Topchian ki Dhani, Navtala ---and deer hunting by Gypsy and KG Sharma (the ban order had not yet percolated) and venison was not uncommon in the offrs mess.

    Lt Anil Kalia was the senior subaltern. Many years later he and I were CO and 21c in another unit and the relationship continued, much to the surprise of  many! Others who served in my time were 2lts/lts JP Singh, Raghavan, Ravi Menon, Unikrishan, Dagar (from Delhi posted to Delhi !), VV, George----

  Capt Sundresan was the OC LRW. Other Capts were Rameshwar Lal, Varma (daddy), Umed Singh Khatri (affectionately known as 'Mess Kesri' in the Stn Arty Mess), Gipsy GPS Chowdhury, Abdul Kader, Chugh, Pradeep Saxena (from Delhi, posted to Delhi !), Vinod Verma (late), AN Sharma and Arul Raj (the famous painter, originally from Bangalore now settled in Delhi I believe), Santokh Singh Bhatia. Capt PK Sharma (an old YO) was posted back just as I left the Valiants. About the same time we had a new capt (IG) posted, I forget his name.

  Capt Deepak Kapoor was the BK Romeo and I was the GPO. Later, when I was Cdr 22 Arty Bde and he was the COAS we spoke of our earlier days in 216.. Capt Balwant was the QM (SL). Originally a TA in 60 Hy before commissioning.

  May have missed out a few names. My apologies (🤗). Memories fade wrt events almost half a century ago.

 *My Quarter Guard Stint* 

I was put into the Quarter guard on the second night of arrival at about 0001 h when I went as 'duty offr'. The guard cdr was Maj KG Sharma (in proper dress of a hav), as I did not have an ID card (it had been 'stolen') and the entire guard did not recognise me as a 216 offr. At about 0600 h I was released by the SM with apologies as some 'mistake" had taken place. Being a fourth generation army offr I knew all about these mistakes ofcourse.

 *The Rock Star*

 Gipsy was a hit in Delhi. His house was in Vasant Vihar. A rock star he was- guitarist and singer. Had a Jawa specially modified in Sanjay Gandhi's factory. They were friends. His single offrs pad had the choicest collection of bikini clad (some without) hollywood actresses and great music.

 *7 Extra Duties* 

Lt Col Sarna once lost his temper in front of the lined up offrs as we stood outside his office for introduction to the new cdr. The uniforms (starched cotton) and the cross belts and Brown shoes of most of the lined up offrs had seen better days. I was the last offr in the line up.

2Lt. 

One star barely visible. Best Tgt. 

He shouted at no one in particular (to incl everyone), and since he was in front of me he added 'give him 7 extra duties'. Well, later Capt Cheema called me to his office and asked me if I wanted the duties spread over or in one go?

"spread over sir".

 He smiled. I may have detected a wink. So I did three duties  in the next two weeks and then to my joy he seemed to have forgotten about the remaining four. Who was I to remind him?

 *The Night Occupation Mishap* 

I think it was in Sept 77. We had a sad incident. During a ni occupation drill, as the Kraz and gun came to a  halt, one of the gnrs jumped out a bit too soon, lost his balance and came under the limber wheel. Fatal. We had a mandir parade a few days later. Ravi Menon will recollect.

 *The Burma Campaign.* 

Maj Bisht had just come back from the staff course. And since the unit had been tasked to give a presentation on the Burma Campaign for the Arty Bde, he was made the OIC for the event by the CO.

We had a small ramshackle two room barrack (offrs sand model and study room) short of  where Manekshaw Center stands today. And 100 yards ahead was our Hockey field (Ravi Menon was a good hockey player) and drill ground. Bang on the turf where this famous Centre now stands.

The presentation was partly a 'play'. I remember Gipsy (sans turban) was Wingate. I was made the IO of Gen Slim and was told to introduce the sand model. It was 1978. WW2 ribbons were easily available in Gopinath bazaar and I had got a couple of them made for the 'actors'. I dont think I was paid for the expenditure (and my pay was a measly Rs 715 per month).

*The Svy Course*

Sometime in 1979 I proceeded on svy course to S of A. And there my IG was late Maj JS Chamba who was a Valiant. His first two  questions were-' did you get pre course trg and is Shankar Patil still the svy NCO?' 

No to both. I did not get any pre course trg and Shankar Patil was the mess hav by then! Another 216 offr (war veteran) in the School at that time was Maj Shah. So despite no pre course trg the Valiant grid was powerful and I came back with flying colours (though I joined aviation much later !!😊).

 *The Coup d' etat* 

This was perhaps 1980. Lt Col Ruhil was taking over the unit from Lt Col Sarna.  It was Col Ruhils dining in. I, Unni, Dagar and Ravi and maybe George and VV were near the bar.

 All 2Lts, Lts, junior (acting) capts.

Away from the bigger brass. In any case we were in awe of the Vir Chakra. Suddenly Col Ruhil saw us and walked towards the bar. 'So, what are you youngsters upto?' 

Maybe I was with one drink too many. Dutch courage. 

'Sir we are thinking of taking over the unit'.

For 5" there was silence. Then Col Ruhill roared with laughter and said-'maybe you should brief me, that's what I am doing these days!'

Well the ice with the new CO was broken.

Must add this. A few months later I was pipped as acting 'capt' by Col Ruhill. 3 years service completed. And within a few months posted out. 

 *R Bty GPO* 

When I joined in 1977, we had plenty of surplus stores.  During the war a lot of replacements had been pushed in terms of manpower (by Arty Centre) and stores (by Ordnance) to make up for losses. TA eqpt, batteries, tele sets, charging sets etc used to be hidden before insps. As a GPO, my stn was the TA store.

 Not to be seen.

 So I spent most of the time with the men. Despite being a Maharatta unit; Sikhs and non Mahrattas also landed up in 216 after the war. Many of the soldiers had wound medals. Patil my opr told me that as he was sitting in the CP a bullet hit his hand holding the tele next to his ear. He lost a finger and the handset was shattered! Close one that.

Chormule, Ingle, Bhonsle, GP Singh, Gawde were the Nos1 with me.

Hav Anand Ubhe was TA hav and Sable, SD Shinde and RD Shinde, Potghun were TA's -- amongst others. 

 Bhintade was SJCO. Suryavanshi was the R Bty BHM (sabh aap se pehle mienay teen GPO train kiye hain). Roshan Lal was the H1 Dvr. Patil was my Opr. Ankush Pawar and Gaekwad were my helpers over time.

Gulzar Singh was a DR (HQ Bty) and Jarnail Singh was P Bty H1 dvr with Ravi Menon. AP Patil was Lt JP's helper or was he with Kalia--- ? JP and Kalia used to stay in the near by ordnance mess as there was a shortage of accn in the Stn Arty Mess.

We had a Sikh AIG ( Harbhajan Singh?) and another one- Ram Asra. The latter was in charge of my YO's pre course trg and we used to go to the ceremonial bty for 25 pdr lessons. Khape was a good boxer and also in the Kabbadi team. Tirupati  was our star BB player. Nalwade was a  wrestler. So was Anand Ubhe.

 *Mien Tehnu Ghassun Marun* 

Loosely translated 'I am going to box you'. Many years later I landed up in 116 Med as the 2ic (Lt Col). This is a story of 116.  Col Kalia (senior subaltern, 216) was the CO. 

As I was getting the regt deployed one cold winter night in Babina rgs, Col Kalia came in his jeep near the svy director where I was standing with the IG (from S of A) and whispered to me that the deployment of P Bty was having some problem. And then he got down from the jeep and began  walking to the RCP with the IG.

I took his jeep as it was the nearest available vehicle, time was short  and told the dvr to get down and  wait there. I drove off to see what the GPO was doing.

After about 30' I returned back. All problems sorted out. Cuckoo Kalia and his dvr were standing like penguins in the  cold, an icy wind was blowing and it was close to midnight. Next to them was the IG. By now the CO was both half frozen and sleepy. Unfortunately his jacket was in the jeep  and I had commandeered it! 

He ran towards me as I got down from 'his' jeep and shouted-'mien tenu ghussan marna'. I grinned at him and suddenly the young IG ran away from there. To cut the story short he later told us 'sir I thought that the CO and 2ic were actually going to have a fist fight'.

*My Dining Out*

  So as the drinks were piled on me, it was my dining out and probably 0ct 1980. Ravi Menon and Dagar were ensuring that my glass was never half empty. Anyway, all good things must  come to an end. It was time for my farewell speech. My rehearsed speech was forgotten, the whiskey had taken its toll. So the speech ended something like this: '--- in the end, on behalf of Col Ruhil, I thank you all for this wonderful evening'.

At that time I was a bit confused as to why my last sentence elicited so much laughter among the offrs and ladies present. One more drink was given to me and thereafter I have hazy memories of being carried to my room.

#3 The Search For Sgt Sidhu

In this post I am giving out a few technical details of the Short Stirling , the bomber in which Sgt Sidhu was the Flight Engineer.---  Type: Four engined heavy bomber. Period of Operation: 1939-1946 (retired from frontline service 1943) Roles: A dedicated four-engined bomber, it was transitioned to glider tug and transport. Successors: The Stirling was replaced by the Handley Page Halifax and Lancaster. Survivors:None. Not even parts in museums. There is an attempt underway to restore one enough for museum display. http://www.stirlingproject.co.uk/

Technical Specifications of the Short Stirling

Crew:

7

Max Speed:

270mph

Service Ceiling:

17,000 feet*

Range:

2010 miles

Engines:

4 x Bristol Hercules engines

Length:

87ft 2 inches

Wingspan:

99 ft

Height:

22 ft 9 inch

Weight:

70,000lbs

SIEGE OF CITIES AND PERILS OF URBAN WARFARE THE RUSSO-UKRAINE WAR

 SIEGE OF CITIES AND PERILS OF URBAN WARFARE

THE RUSSO-UKRAINE WAR

(D S SARAO)

"I believe that at the heart of Russian military thinking is how Marshal Zhukov marched across Eastern Europe to Berlin," a former high-level CIA official told Newsweek in an interview. Zhukov's orders were to "line up the artillery and ... flatten everything ahead of you," he says. "'Then send in the peasant Army to kill or rape anyone left alive.' Subtle the Russians are not."

---William Arkin

Introduction

    Dr Christiopher Brassford, a well known American military historian has very eloquently summed up the politico-military objectives for starting any war; these may range from causing intimidation; to change in policy, to regime change or for destruction of military potential or for taking a slice of territory or for even complete absorption.

   On the other hand, for the defender, the ultimate object of all defense is preservation; and since it is easier to hold ground than to take it, Clausewitz was right in his conclusions about defense ‘that defense is an easier operation of war than attack’. Paradoxically, defense may be the ‘stronger form of war’, but it is the tactic of the weaker force. And if it relates to the defense of a city, the advantage definitely rests with the defender. Again, borrowing a quote from Clausewitz, ‘the acts we consider most important for the defeat of the enemy are destruction of his army and seizure of his capital; (which is) not only the center of administration but also that of social, professional, and political activity’.

   Thus far military history had also taught that a large hostile city should not normally be taken as a military objective--bypass, mask, surround, invest, blockade, encircle, isolate; the bottom line being to avoid entering or laying a siege to a city. But conventional warfare and set piece attacks with the standard  3:1 attacker-defender ratio as normally followed in classic battles (open countryside with minimum chances of collateral damage) may not be the norm any longer. Instead, military operations may most likely be conducted in cities and urban environments. The ongoing Russian-Ukraine war reinforces this. Nonetheless, urban warfare involving siege and subsequent capture of a city will still be dictated by the basic  principles governing an attacking force : reconnoiter the objective, obtain a favorable air situation, move to the objective, apply maximum combat power, isolate the objective, secure a foothold, execute a breach, clear the objective, consolidate and reorganize. Whereas the methodology to ‘attack and capture’ remains the same, the application and use of combat power including aerial assets will be substantially different in an urban environment.

   Conducting a city assault requires understanding of how to achieve the mission of destroying the enemy forces and seizing the city with the lowest possible casualties to own forces, civilian population and the city’s infrastructure. The ultimate responsibility of feeding and providing medical aid, water, electricity, municipal services,and administration then fall on the occupying power. Regardless of mission, cities require militaries to conceptualize ways to operate that are unique to the environment.  Militaries have a long history of fighting for cities, but not in them.

Urban Warfare-City Fighting

    In US military jargon, MOUT or Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain, is defined as all military actions planned and conducted on a topographical complex and its adjacent terrain where man made construction is the dominant feature. It includes combat in cities, which is that portion of MOUT involving house-to-house and street-by-street fighting in towns and cities. The side that controls a major city usually has a psychological advantage, which can be enough to significantly affect the outcome of a conflict.

A well thought out plan with inbuilt redundancies catering for contingencies, logistics backup, linkups with advance forces and a successful ‘conflict resolution plan’ are absolutely necessary when laying siege to a city. In addition, intelligence, interoperability/jointmanship, suppression of AD resources, use of drones and battlefield management are the non-negotiables in conventional and more so in urban warfare. This assumes all the more importance once advancing forces have been halted  or where the time plan of the attacker has been upset. Some of the peculiarities related to urban fighting and capture of a city are discussed in this article. 

      Locating the enemy strong points in built up areas, especially cities and concepts like identifiable ‘forward lines of own troops’ and ‘secure rear areas’ once you have moved deep into enemy territory are extremely difficult in urban operations. Urban fighting necessitates a particular capability mix of mobility, protection, and firepower, and avoidance of excessive damage to civilian lives and infrastructure thus limiting full application of the attackers combat power.   

   Fighting in urban areas is primarily a small-unit, infantry intensive operation. Urban combat requires small-unit leadership, initiative, and skill. Decentralized actions and difficulties in command, control and communications are typically encountered. Built-up areas, close terrain and city fighting are generally considered to be most suited for operations conducted by foot soldiers. Infantry units should be organized, trained and equipped to negotiate urbanized terrain that restricts observation, fields of fire, and mechanized movement. 

   To say that use of air power, artillery (including tactical missiles and PGM’s) or armoured vehicles cannot be used in an urban battle scenario would be a fallacy. Infact the protection provided by armoured vehicles and their shock effect should be exploited to the hilt, but with a caveat- to be used in close coordination with protection by infantry. Tanks in support of infantry are potent direct firing weapons with a variety of munitions and can deliver accurate, concentrated and sustained fires to flush out the defenders from buildings and other concrete structures. It has been proven in multiple battles that without the use of armour in urban operations, victory will be long delayed, if not unachievable. Armour must be used and protected well by the other combat arms so that a symbiotic relationship exists, working together to defeat the enemy. 

   Indirect and long range artillery including MBRL’s too can be used by the aggressor in built-up areas, to isolate the enemy or prevent isolation of own forces and within the built-up area SP, and field/medium artillery can provide direct-fire support. Field artillery in direct firing role with a variety of munitions, combined with infantry and anti-tank teams, can be skilfully employed to facilitate infantry and armour, in flushing out the defenders and for physical and psychological harassment of the enemy. 

   

   On the other hand, use of long range artillery, missiles and airpower can also cause problems for the attacker. In addition the huge amount of collateral damage to the city infrastructure like schools, hospitals, residential areas, buildings, communication centers and civilian casualties itself, may cause international condemnation and intervention. The rubble resulting from use of air power, indirect artillery fires and use of missiles to target HVT’s in a city having concrete structures and multi-storey buildings can create considerable obstacles for the attacker while providing the defender with obstacles, materials, cover, and concealment. 

   Unlike most cities in Asia and Africa, cities of Europe have ‘cities under cities’. There is a vast network of underground structures-- basements, metro networks, tunnels, sewerage lines, maintenance conduits, parking spaces, sub-ways; even World War 2 bomb shelters. These underground passages are often used by the civilian population for protection against bombing and by the defenders to facilitate the transport of weapons, food, medical supplies, ammunition and war material and to hide and move ‘stay behind parties’, or as venues for launching clandestine incursions, tank hunting teams and ‘popping’ out behind the enemy as fighting progresses house to house, street to street and block by block. Advantage- defender. 

The Leningrad Lesson Russia Has Forgotten 

    As part of Barborosa, Hitler had intended to occupy Leningrad. Consequently Army Group North under Field Marshal Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb advanced to Leningrad, its primary objective.

   As the German war machine advanced, towards the end of June 1941, the Leningrad administration, fearing that the Germans would soon lay siege to the city, organized "first response groups" of civilians. In the next few weeks, Leningrad's civilian population of over a million citizens were mobilized for the construction of fortifications. Several lines of defenses were built along the city's perimeter to repulse hostile forces approaching from north and south by means of civilian resistance. A total of 306 km  of timber barricades, 635 km of wire entanglements, 700 km of anti-tank ditches, 5,000 earth-and-timber emplacements and reinforced concrete weapon emplacements and 25,000 km of open trenches were constructed or excavated by the civilian population.

   The siege of Leningrad began on 08 September 1941, when the Wehrmacht severed the last road to the city.    Although Soviet forces managed to open a narrow land corridor to the city on 18 January 1943, the Soviet Army could not lift the siege till January 1944. The blockade became one of the longest and most destructive sieges in history, and it was possibly the costliest siege in history due to the number of casualties which were suffered throughout its duration. In the 21st century, some historians have classified it as a genocide due to the systematic starvation and intentional destruction of the city's civilian population.

   By 08 September, German forces had largely surrounded the city, cutting off all supply routes to Leningrad and its suburbs. Unable to press home their offensive, and facing defenses of the city organized by Marshal Zhukov, the German armies laid siege to the city for "900 days and nights."

   On 21 September, German High Command considered how to destroy Leningrad. Occupying the city was ruled out ‘’because it would make us responsible for food supply." The 872 days of the siege caused extreme famine in the Leningrad region through disruption of infrastructure, utilities, water, energy and food supplies by continuous aerial and ground bombardment. This resulted in the deaths of up to 1,500,000 soldiers and civilians and the evacuation of 1,400,000 more (mainly women and children), many of whom died during evacuation due to starvation and bombardment.

   The tenacious Soviet defense of Leningrad cost the attacking Germans dearly in every way and set up conditions for a decisive counteroffensive by the Russians. 75 years later, the Russians appear to have forgotten this battle!

Ukraine-The Russian Experience

   ‘Sometimes It becomes necessary to destroy the town to save it’, that is how a US army major, during the Vietnam war (some may call it insurgency), described the decision to use massive amounts of firepower, to include aerial bombs and artillery, while attacking approximately 2,500 Viet Cong who were besieging the city of Ben Tre and its surrounding villages. Vietnamese provincial authorities assessed that 85 percent of the city was destroyed and up to 1,000 civilians were killed in the operation.  

  Applying the same logic to a conventional war between two countries, ‘sometimes it becomes necessary to destroy cities to save them.’ Destructive tactics may be required to liberate a city from enemy forces that choose to defend in urban areas. 

   In its ‘special operation’ to achieve a politico-military objective by making Kherson, Kyiv, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Mariupol and Melitopol as their objectives, Russia has incorrectly let its political objective override its larger military objective (and capability)  in Ukraine. The unexplained stalling of huge Russian convoys of tanks, support and logistics vehicles and the vulnerability of the Russian ground forces and aerial assets to Ukranian drones, man portable anti-tank weapons and AD assets have been seen by the entire world. 

   With emergency services and a command and control structure battered but largely intact, the Ukrainian defenders have been able to resist and still fight a coordinated battle. Apparently the Russian military has not been able to integrate any of the modern instruments of warfare; electronic warfare, cyber, space, air dominance, use of drones, media, publicity, battlefield field-management—into its overall plan. Elimination of the Ukrainian electronic spectrum to include their early warning systems, radars, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance sources along with the degradation of the Ukrainian command and control structure before advancing ‘line ahead’ would have paid rich dividends.  

   As per a Newsweek report, American intelligence sources have concluded that while the Russian ground forces have been surprisingly sluggish and uncoordinated, they were also severely constrained in their initial attack by the Kremlin's strategy and objectives. Urban warfare necessitates the need to isolate and destroy enemy forces which have taken defensive positions in the city while causing minimum collateral damage to the city’s infrastructure and population. ‘There's only so much civil infrastructure one can destroy if the intention is occupation of the country (or city).’ The urban terrain reduces the attacker’s advantages in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, the utility of aerial assets, and the attacker’s ability to engage at distance. Conversely,the defender can see and engage the attacker coming, because the attacker has limited cover and concealment.

    From the standpoint of the Ukranians, their main effort is to delay and make the enemy approach to the cities very costly. Four weeks down the line the Russian forces have still not breached the cities of Kharkiv and Kiev. At the present point of time, it appears that the defenders of the ‘cities’ appear to have the upper hand. 

Conclusion

   History shows that the ability of a defender to withstand the siege or capture of a city having a substantial population and a fairly developed infrastructure will largely depend on three variables- firstly, the will of the population and the nation to continue the struggle, secondly a leadership which remains intact and effective to rally the population and to coordinate the national effort, and thirdly the military capability to continue contesting the enemy .    

Collateral damage and international repercussions make military operations in such a complex physical environment difficult and restrict the use of the entire spectrum of combat power available to the attacker. On the other hand, the history of urban warfare is full of cases of tenacious defenders using a single building or a series of buildings to hold off far superior attackers. In the 2004 Battle of Fallujah, it was the ‘House of Hell’, where just a few suspected Chechen fighters turned a house into a death trap for the American soldiers trying to take it. During the 1942 Battle of Stalingrad, small groups of Russian soldiers held single buildings for months against German tank, artillery, and infantry assaults.

    In the end a modern army backed by a large military-industrial complex with the ability to sustain heavy attrition will eventually win the war using its airforce, artillery, tanks, infantry and its overwhelming combat power —but at major costs with its time, space and effort thrown out of gear and at the cost of its reputation and international standing. 

We are seeing it happening.

 

 

WHY DID THE AFGHAN MILITARY FALL WITHOUT FIRING A SHOT

 *Why did the Afghan military fall within a week without firing a shot??*

Because of lack of cohesion, the absence of unit bonding, no espirit d' corps, no belief in the cause and worst- no leadership, ethos and pride in the uniform they wore.

A military is never made overnight. Units have established histories and armies are made of these units.
Even new units and young soldiers are carried along in the hubris of being part of  of the nations 'military'.

*The nation puts them on a pedestal- and the soldier pays back by fighting for the nation.*

When the nation so demands it.

Soldiers develop an inherent sense of pride in belonging to a body of men-- the unit.  There is a soldierly bond between the officers, JCO's and men.

It starts from a section, onto my 'company', my 'unit', my 'brigade', my 'division', my 'corps, command and army'; and that finally makes him say ' *'my nation' - I will die for it'.*

*Herein lies the difference between military and  para- military.*

Equipment and weapons dont decide on whether a soldier will fight; or melt away into the darkness.

The Afghan soldiers in this case were the para military and the US soldiers the military.

So here we have one Afghan brother who joined the Afghan military and the other the Taliban. Same tribe, same village, same education-- one was ready to fight and die, the other vanished. 

Not that the 'military' brother was less brave.

The same  two brothers are here too, in India.

One joins the military , the other the para military (CISF or ITBP or CRPF or BSF or SSB).

*Be rest assured the Indian para military brother is as brave and willing to fight as the military brother.*

But if tomorrow you replace the Indian Army with the Para- Military, the same will happen in a 'war'.

Why?

Because soldiers develop an inherent sense of pride in belonging to a body of men-- the unit.  _There is a soldierly bond between the officers, JCO's and men._

'Naam, Namak, Nishan'  --
cohesion, bonding, sacrifice,  fighting spirit, tradition, history; to keep the flag flying.

We are in it together, the unspoken espirit d' corps of a fighting military.

Heroes of previous wars are considered icons. The soldiers are moulded in the unit history, exploits, traditions.
'Izzat' governs a units performance and the will of the soldiers to face  bullets.

Or obey orders to ' _charge up a hill'._

You take away that feeling of 'izzat' from the military,  equate them to the police and para military, remove them from the pedestal they deserve and force them to be part of 'cultural changes' and to give up their traditions;  the  military will become para military and vanish when you want it most!

And I once again say-- the military soldier and the para military soldier are equally brave. But they belong to different worlds. 

*So where did the Americans and the Afghan government go wrong in training a 300,000 strong military?*

Unfortunately, the Afghan military was more adept in policing duties, enforcing law and order, urban presence, cordon and search.

Flag marches, area and city domination under US directions and control; always under protection and shadow of big brother.

These kind  of forces and expensive military hardware  look good on 26th Jan type of parades.

Heavy weapons, attack helicopters, tanks, artillery are of no use with 'policing forces'. Not trained to use them.

They had them, thats about all. No structured military organisation.

Firing a gun is one thing, employing a gun is another.
A  trained No 1 and his team of gunners  can *fire* the Bofors gun.

But it is the Battery Commander  or Commanding Officer who knows how to *employ* them.

So the Afghan soldiers  were trained to *fire* guns, fly choppers, drive tanks and Humvees -- someone forgot to teach them how to ' *employ* ' all this sophisticated hardware.

How to actually 'fight a war'.

- _--- and no war games and presentations and excercises and military studies and courses_ 

When the military heirarchial structure is  weak or isolated from troops on ground with the  added misery of lack of a clear aim; indiferrent  command and control, poor  communications, weak leadership; it falls apart.

You think 1962 would neccessarily have been a rout?? Just because we had .303's or 'no woollens and shoes' ( sic)!!

We could have fought  and ensured that the Chinese got a 'victory' of the type they got when they invaded Vietnam!!  But we had started falling apart, panic with leadership, civil and military, in chaos !
Bhago -- bhago, with many posts vacated without a shot fired or a Chinese seen.

*In no way to disparage those brave Indians who stood,  fought  and died.*
*And there were many*

Thus the Afghan senior military  officers became IG's and DIG's and Police Commissioners  with policemen in tanks and Humvees under them.

*Policing and internal security became the 'primary' task.*

They were not ready for classic  battles, urban or guerilla warfare.

Or  for stopping the advance of an 'invading' army.
Not really trained for tactical actions, support by armed/attack heptrs (probably never studied  pamphlets on operations of war!), battle drills and battle procedures against lightly armed, mobile, motivated guerilla type fighters who did not require large administrative  support or weapons-- only cars, pickups, motorcycles and petrol.

ORGANISATIONAL TRANSFORMATION, CREATIVE DESTRUCTION AND THEATERISATION

 ORGANISATIONAL TRANSFORMATION, CREATIVE DESTRUCTION AND THEATERISATION

(NEW WINE IN NEW BOTTLES)

D S SARAO

 

 If the Greyhound Bus Company can demonstrate a capability of delivering bombs better than any other agency, that company will get the job

Introduction

1  Over the years, once World War II ended, relative autonomy of the individual American armed services was restored to a large measure which led to competition, turf wars and low levels of coordination in the US war fighting machinery. For almost a decade well into the cold war, each of the services was busy honing and formulating their doctrines as to how theory would fight a war. As a result, in the Korean and Vietnam wars, the Navy and Air Force ran essentially independent air campaigns.  Incidentally, the heavy AF bombing campaign (Linebacker) could not defeat the Vietnamese. Granted, neither was victory obtained by the ground forces.

 

2   World opinion did not allow the Americans to have a free hand.The rule stands for all wars of the present day. Because international opinion allows only this much-- and not more. Subsequent US operations in Lebanon and Grenada in the early 1980’s too were marred by the services’ inability to cooperate effectively leading to significant adverse effects on military performance which was often wastefully redundant. The lack of interoperability, turf wars and inbuilt ‘silos’ hampered attempts at cooperation and synergy. 

 

3  Turf wars devastate organizations. They waste resources, kill productivity, and jeopardize the achievement of goals. Turf wars in organizations commonly occur in environments where competition undermines collaboration. These fratricidal ‘wars’ have an adverse effect on organizational performance because of ‘silo mentality’, a mindset present when certain departments do not wish to cooperate or share information and resources with others in the same organisation. This type of mentality reduces efficiency and interoperability in the overall operation and ultimately contributes to the dis-array of an organisation which did not adapt to the changed environment.

4  Purely service based domains are not viable anymore. If it is a better idea for the AD assets to be under an Air Defence Commander, so be it. If the Western Theater Commander has dedicated fixed wing and rotary assets with a staff composed of progressive  bright minds of the army and air force to make battle plans for conducting operations-- so be it. No one is calling for a change of roles/tasks of the services but it has to be appreciated that  primary and secondary tasks of arms and services are adaptive, interchangeable and can evolve as per the requirement. In any case the role of any of the three services is not being changed or challenged. Neither is the competency of any of the Chiefs being questioned. A unified leadership team will encourage trust, create empowerment, and break military managers out of the ‘my department’ mentality and into the ‘our organization’ mentality. When we take a deeper look at the root cause of these issues, we find that more often than not silos are the result of a conflicted leadership team. 

Defining Theaterisation 

5  Carl von Clausewitz defines the term ‘theater’ (kriegstheater) as one that denotes ‘a portion of space over which war prevails and has its boundaries protected and thus possesses a kind of independence’. This protection may consist of fortresses or important natural obstacles presented by the country, or even in it’s being separated by a considerable distance from the rest of the space embraced in the war. The thought behind the ‘kriegstheater’ basically being a theater of operations defined by the commander who is orchestrating or providing support for specific combat operations within the theater. 

 

6  Even the WW II German military, arguably having one of the finest General Staff structures, suffered from inter-service rivalry and overreaching interference/control by higher echelons, especially after 1944, as the tide of war turned. Military operations in the Western theater were placed under the direction of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) which reported to Hitler separately as different from the Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH) which was responsible for the Eastern Front. To give one example, under the OKW, the defense of Western Europe was entrusted to Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, who as the overall commander had no direct authority over Navy Group West or the Third Air Fleet. Both these forces reported to their own high commands, which in turn reported to Hitler. This resulted in German forces fighting in an uncoordinated manner with a waste of sparse resources, as the allies began their push in Europe. 

7  The term theater of operations is defined in the American field manuals as the land and sea areas to be invaded or defended, including areas necessary for administrative activities incident to the military operations. A theater command is therefore tailor made to control  military assets in a theater of war to achieve military aim. Simplistically put, it places all available resources of air, ground and land at the disposal of a senior military commander.

8  In our context, the integrated theater commands envisage a unified command of the three Services, under a single commander. The Shekatkar Committee formed by the then Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar (chaired by Lt General D B Shekatkar) had recommended not only the requirement of a CDS,  but also the formation of three integrated theater commands namely, Western for the Pakistan border, Northern for the China border and Southern for the maritime role. The Kargil Review Committee (1999), which was set up after the end of the Kargil War, had also recommended the creation of joint theater commands. The GoI has already approved the formation of theater commands and there is no requirement of any ‘act of parliament’ similar to the ‘Goldwater-Nichols Defence Reorganization Act of 1986’ in the United States, as is being professed by many. The question is no longer ‘if’ but ‘when’. 

The Need For Organisational Transformation

9   Taking a leaf from the corporate world, ‘Organizational Transformation’ is a strategic method of getting your organization from where you are now to where you will need to be in the future’. In many cases, this transformation is required to address a problem or change that’s long overdue. Studying the effect of automation with respect to the functioning of the corporate world, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) economists John Hawksworth and Yuval Fertig concluded  that for many roles, ‘some tasks will become more valuable and other tasks will be eliminated’. Similarly, in fields such as the military, the availability, allotment, utilisation of resources and the command and control for fighting an integrated battle may need to be structured very differently to meet new challenges. Duplication, waste of effort, waste of resources, dual command, compartmentalisation-----will be eliminated and ‘some military tasks will become more valuable and other tasks will be eliminated’. 

 

10  The art of warfare and military strategy must constantly evolve and adapt to meet a variety of challenges—from changes in military technology to the development of new weapons; to a shift in concepts of warfare to include hybrid warfare, limited war, unconventional warfare and asymmetric warfare. In the subcontinental context, our ability to fight a two front war with the integrated use of the entire military force in tandem with political, economic, informational and national resources assumes importance. And all this in a seamless non- compartmentalised manner. This becomes all the more necessary as military technologies shift to artificial intelligence, robotics/drones, human enhancement and human genomics. We can no longer afford to be ready and prepared with an archaic command and control system ready to fight the ‘last war’.

11  Thus the requirement of strengthening the centralisation of resources and transition from a strictly ‘service chief headed’ vertical command to a unified system of putting troops and weapon systems under an ‘overall’ commander to achieve synergy, economy of effort and application of max combat power. There should be no hesitancy to restructure or combine roles or ‘have an organisational transformation’ if that’s what is needed in the military environment of the day. 

Creative Destruction Is Desirable

12  Failure to do so could lead to stagnation or worse failure and elimination of organisations, leaders and entities which do not adapt to the contemporary requirements. Or in other words face ‘creative destruction,’ a term coined by Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter in 1942. Schumpeter characterized creative destruction ‘as innovations and changes that increase effectiveness and potency of the structure from within; incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one’. Creative destruction therefore is the deliberate dismantling of established processes in order to make way for improved methods.

 

13  In the Second World War, Generals Douglas MacArthur and Dwight D Eisenhower were put in roles in which they commanded vast tri-service military operations. Despite the victory in the war, major structural flaws were observed resulting in the creation of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff as the principal military adviser in the United States. In the United Kingdom, by the 1960s, the three military headquarters were integrated into the Ministry of Defence and the post of Chief of Defence Staff as the principal military adviser created. France, Germany and Australia have also shifted to a more integrated defence management system. In Russia the creation of strategic commands was laid down in 2010 and soon after China followed with the 2015 People's Republic of China military reforms and the creation of five theater commands.

14  Today our enemies have some of the finest weapon systems in terms of technology, destructive power, real time intelligence gathering, identifying, locating and precision targeting; all supported by electronic warfare, hypersonic weapons, information management systems, unmanned aircrafts/UAV’s and robotics. This necessitates us to have the ability to strike the enemy by bringing our entire combat potential to bear on the enemy in all three military dimensions of land, air and sea. Modern military doctrine also recognises the need for impacting the enemy throughout the depth of its territory simultaneously -- in the global information space, in the air, on land and on sea; by using all available resources as a ‘complete and integrated’ package. And if this process entails an element of ‘creative destruction’, the same has to be accepted for larger gains in our war fighting ability.

Theaterisation-Not A Bad Idea

15  In the newly emerging scenarios, with threat perceptions ever changing, the possibility of an unsymmetrical or ‘limited area’ confrontation remains high. It would be outside the capabilities of any single service to respond effectively to such a diverse array of threats. Such conditions call for a total and real time coordination among the three services. The existing  Chief of Staff Committee has not proved to be very effective. The appointment of the CDS and formulation of the Department of Military Affairs is still beset with teething problems, acceptability and turf wars. In this muddle, throw in the Defence Secretary, the MOD and the National Security Adviser who also act as the interface between the Service Chiefs and the Cabinet Committee of Security or the National Security Council. And with more than 15 different commands of the three services (plus two tri-service commands: Strategic Forces Command (SFC) and Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) headed by rotation by officers from the three Services) most not even co-located; joint operations, information flows, and rapid decision-making, allocation/availability of tri-service resources; so vital in modern warfare is only in name at best. If anything, ‘penny packet’ distribution of resources exists here; in the existing system.

16  If the recent precision targeting of Palestinian targets by Israel or the use of AI and drones with devastating effect by Azerjaiban military or closer home the alarm caused by drones in the Jammu and Gurdaspur areas are any indication, we need to place a very high priority on modernizing the country’s capability to command complex joint operations in the battlefield. There is an urgent need to enhance the military’s joint command and control systems. As also the joint logistics, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems. The envisaged theater commands will be effective organisational structures designed to control all such military assets in a theater of war to achieve desired military results.

 17  The present system of structured, compartmentalised service HQ’s with their ‘stand alone’ doctrines need to be replaced by force HQ’s which are more modern, task oriented, flexible and threat tailored. Thus there is a requirement of unified command in a theater of war with the overall commander having a guaranteed and lethal ‘force’ of all arms and services to project power and conduct joint operations in a high-intensity high technology conflict by shortening the  OODA Loop.  Time-sensitive decisions can be taken by theater commanders (and subordinate commanders) rapidly, especially when there may not be time to gather all the information or depend on nebulous availability of combat power not under their control. Inherently, one of the goals of designating a theater commander being to execute the OODA loop process faster than an opponent, in order to infiltrate and disrupt his decision cycle. 

 

The Chinese Model

18  Being our ‘enemy number one’, it would be worth the while to study the Chinese model. In its quest to have a ‘world-class’ military by the end of 2049, the PLA has continued to transition into a more modern, mobile, and lethal ground force through the fielding of upgraded combat systems and the integration of communications equipment and other technologies. The PLA is the principal armed wing of the Communist Party and does not directly serve the state. The Central Military Commission (CMC), currently chaired by Xi Jinping, is the highest military decision-making body in China.The PLA’s modernization seeks to improve its ability to conduct joint operations and has been able to create and task based formations at lower echelons that are more operationally flexible and better suited to conducting and managing complex combined-arms and joint operations.

 

19  In addition to the People's Liberation Army, Navy and Airforce, there exists the PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF), a theater command-level organization established to centralize the PLA’s strategic space, cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare missions and capabilities. The fifth organisation in this structure is the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF), responsible for the PRC’s strategic land-based nuclear and conventional missile forces. 

20  As part of its modernisation drive, the PLA has reduced the erstwhile Military Regions/Military Districts from 11 to 7 to the current 5 Theatre Commands. With a force that totals approximately two million personnel in the regular forces, the PLA’s war fighting ability envisages joint command and control systems, joint logistics systems, and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems divided into five geographical entities; the Northern, Western, Southern, Eastern, Central Theater Commands. In addition, to obtain better synergy and war fighting capability, the PLA has now standardized its 13 group armies (roughly corps level equivalent), as part of an effort to downsize and streamline the PLA’s force structure. Each group army now includes multiple combined-arms brigades. In total, these 78 combined-arms brigades serve as the PLA’s primary maneuver force. The theater commands have task based components of all arms, services and support services - PLA Army, PLA Navy, PLA Air Force, PLA Rocket Force, PLA Strategic Support Force and the  PLA Joint Logistic Support Force.

21  In 2019, the PLAN (People’s Liberation Army Navy) continued to implement structural reforms that began in late 2015 and early 2016. The PLAN organizes, mans, trains, and equips the PLA’s naval and naval aviation forces, as well as the PLA Marine Corps (PLANMC), which is subordinate to the PLAN. Similar to the other services, the PLA-wide reforms removed the PLAN headquarters from conducting operations, which became the purview of the PLA’s joint Theater Commands, and focused it on organizing, manning, training, and equipping naval forces.The PLAN’s force structure consists of three fleets with subordinate submarine flotillas, surface ship flotillas, aviation brigades, and naval bases. The PLAN’s North Sea Fleet is subordinate to the Northern Theater Command, the East Sea Fleet is subordinate to the Eastern Theater Command, and the South Sea Fleet is subordinate to the Southern Theater Command.  

22  The PLAAF (People’s Liberation Army Air Force) constitutes the largest aviation forces in the region and is the third largest in the world with over 2,500 total aircraft (not including trainer variants or UAVs) of which approximately 2,000 are combat aircraft (including fighters, strategic bombers, tactical bombers, multi-mission tactical, and attack aircraft). The PLAAF’s role is to serve as a comprehensive strategic air force capable of long-range airpower projection. The PLAAF is comprised of aviation, airborne, air defense, radar, electronic countermeasure, and communications forces. Amid the wide-ranging reorganization of the PLA, the PLAAF too has reorganized into five Theater Command Air Forces, established at least six new air bases, and restructured previously subordinate regiments into brigades under the new bases by disbanding its fighter and fighter-bomber divisions.

Conclusion

23  As is implied by the words ‘creative destruction’, the process inevitably results in losers and winners within an organisation. Military leaders committed to the older technology and outdated concepts of warfare will be left stranded. Entrepreneurs of progressive military thought and understanding of new technologies may create temporary disequilibrium but will become harbingers of new opportunities for victory in the battlefield. Theaterisation is one such concept whose time has come.

 

24  It would be a fallacy to imagine that theatrisation would lead to employment of resources, specially of aerial assets in ‘penny packets’ or that we do not have enough resources or that the concept has ‘huge’ financial implications (to fight a war!). The argument that theater commands suit the big three because militarily they are  self-sufficient, have large defence outlays or they foresee ‘out of area operations’ is not relevant to the core issue.

 

 

25  Two things need to be clarified here. Firstly, allotment of resources to a theatre does eliminate any of the principles of war, but actually enhances unity of command and 

economy of effort. Utilisation, allotment, switching/removal and re-allotment of resources to a theater will always depend on the military situation and the overall national aim. Secondly, diverting of land, sea or air resources (could be in terms of time or space also) from the control of a theatre commander will now be dependent on an organisation which in effect is responsible for the higher direction of war. Service dominated hierarchical control in any case is wasteful, myopic and no longer tenable in today’s battlefield.

 

 26  Finally, perhaps a very churlish argument projected by naysayers is that the theater commander may lack domain knowledge for use of the other two services under his command! Needless to say, the overall force commander will always have a competent and subordinate all services staff HQ's for domain advice. It is one of the primary functions of the staff to develop and integrate individual service activities enabling a commander to balance the art of command and the science of control.

WHEN YOU HAVE TO SHOOT, SHOOT; DONT TALK